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Player 1 and Player 2 choose and integer between 0 and 100. Their choice is made...

Player 1 and Player 2 choose and integer between 0 and 100. Their choice is made simultaneously and independently. Suppose player 1 chooses x and player 2 chooses y. If x < y Player 1 obtains x and Player 2 obtains zero. Similarly, if y < x Player 2 obtains y and Player 1 obtains zero. If x = y then each one obtains x/2. The number of pure strategy Nash equilibrium is_____________ (Please, enter only a numerical values, for example: 0, 1, 2,...,50, etc.).  

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