Player 1 and Player 2 choose and integer between 0 and 100. Their choice is made simultaneously and independently. Suppose player 1 chooses x and player 2 chooses y. If x < y Player 1 obtains x and Player 2 obtains zero. Similarly, if y < x Player 2 obtains y and Player 1 obtains zero. If x = y then each one obtains x/2. The number of pure strategy Nash equilibrium is_____________ (Please, enter only a numerical values, for example: 0, 1, 2,...,50, etc.).
Please Kindly help with
Thumbs up for this answer. If any doubts feel free to query. Thank
you
Player 1 and Player 2 choose and integer between 0 and 100. Their choice is made...
Game: Extensive Form. Suppose player 1 chooses G or H, and player 2 observes this choice. If player 1 chooses H, then player 2 must choose A or B. Player 1 does not get to observe this choice by player 2, and must then choose X or Y. If A and X are played, the payoff for player 1 is 1 and for player 2 it's 5. If A and Y are played, the payoff for player 1 is 6...
In the extensive form representation of the game between Player 1 and Player 2, Player 1 moves first and chooses L or R. If Player 1 chooses R the game ends, if Player 1 chooses L then Player 1 and 2 play a simultaneous move game. The game has______________ pure strategy Nash equilibria and__________ pure strategy Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE). The maximum payoff Player 2 gets in a SPNE is___________ . (Please, enter only numerical answers like: 1, 2,...
Consider a game between a police officer (player 3) and two drivers (players 1 and 2). Player 1 lives and drives in Wynwood, whereas player 2 lives and drives in Sweetwater. On a given day, players 1 and 2 each have to decide whether or not to use their cell phones while driving. They are not friends, so they will not be calling each other. Thus, whether player 1 uses a cell phone is independent of whether player 2 uses...
Game Theory problem
Player 1 chooses a positive integer x 〉 0 and player II chooses a positive integer y > 0. The player with the lower number pays a dollar to the player with the higher number unless the higher number is more than twice larger in which case the payments are reversed if x = y. Find the unique optimal strategy in this game
Player 1 chooses a positive integer x 〉 0 and player II chooses a...
Consider a game in which Player 1 first selects between L and R. If Player 1 selects L, then players 1 and 2 play a prisoner’s dilemma game represented in the strategic form above. If Player 1 selects R then, Player 1 and 2 play the battle-of-the-sexes game in which they simultaneously and independently choose between A and B. If they both choose A, then the payoff vector is (4,4). If they both choose B, then the payoff vector is...
Consider a game being played between player 1 and player 2. Player 1 can choose T or B. Player 2 can take actions Lor R. These choices are made simultaneously. The payoffs are as follows. If 1 plays T and 2 plays L, the payoffs are (0, 0) for Player 1 and 2, respectively. If 1 opts of B and 2 L, the payoffs are (5,7). If 1 plays T and 2 R, the payoffs are (6,2). Finally, both players...
3.2) (0,0) (24) 6,4) (0,) In the extensive form representation of the game between Player 1 and Flayer 2 Player 1 moves first and chooses L or R. If Player 1 chooses R the game ends, if Player 1 chooses L then Player 1 and 2 play a simultaneous move game. The game has pure strategy Nash equibra and pure strategy Subgame Pertect Nash Equnbia (SPNE). The maximum payott Flayer 2 gete in a SHNE IS Please, enter oniy numencal...
Consider a game in which, simultaneously, player 1 selects a number x and player 2 select a number y, where x and y must be greater than or equal to 0. Player 1's payoff is U1 = 8x - 2xy - x2 and player 2's payoff is U2 = 4by + 2xy - y? The parameter b is privately known to player 2. Player 1 knows only that b = O with probability 1/2 and b = 4 with probability...
QUESTION 6 X 3, 0 A > 8, 5 Y 4, 6 W 2, 1 Y 6,4 7 3, 2 Consider the extensive form game of complete and imperfect information above. The number of pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in the game is (Please, type only numerical values, for example: 0, 1, 2, 3,....)
QUESTION 6 X 3, 0 A > 8, 5 Y 4, 6 W 2, 1 Y 6,4 7 3, 2 Consider the extensive form game of complete...
13. Consider the following n-player game. Simultaneously and independently, the players each select either X, Y, or Z. The payoffs are defined as follows. Each player who selects X obtains a payoff equal to y, where y is the num- ber of players who select Z. Each player who selects Y obtains a payoff of 2a, where a is the number of players who select X. Each player who selects Z obtains a payoff of 3B, where ß is the...