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In the extensive form representation of the game between Player 1 and Player 2, Player 1...

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In the extensive form representation of the game between Player 1 and Player 2, Player 1 moves first and chooses L or R. If Player 1 chooses R the game ends, if Player 1 chooses L then Player 1 and 2 play a simultaneous move game. The game has______________ pure strategy Nash equilibria and__________ pure strategy Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE). The maximum payoff Player 2 gets in a SPNE is___________ . (Please, enter only numerical answers like: 1, 2, 3, ...)  

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Answe Cniventhat A game is the styategic intevaction between kwo ov more playev in the pvocess of e caromic decision making each agent uwho make the canditeion decision ina game is called the player has seat of choices to decide upon these choices ave Called the stra tegies The strateics ave tied to Certain out come Called Pa ocFs The Nosh eejuitibvium of the game occurs shen bath the loyew toke best stva tegies in vespone to the stvoteg ies o the othev playe The pvisonev di lemma a situation wheve the Playe chose a Nosh ehat is not a ssoc iated ith the highest pay ƠFE of the players. The move that the player chase no motte he other plaver do is called the do mintontstaategThe move that a plaver nevev play mo matler ahat the othev plavev do is called the do minated stvateg y. The equjlibr ium (wheve cach plaver ploy their dom inant skvategies is canied the dominant Sbrateas eabrium The game in the layer -1 Stvategic Corms belo layer 2 Ln | 2,4 | 0,0 From the game above there is tuwo pure stategy Nash equilibria and in the back eard induction method theve is 3SPNE The highest pay afF df playevis 4.

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