Question

4. (General Extensive Form Game ID Suppose the following general extensive-form game. Player 1 Player 2 (0, 4) (4,0 (4, 0) (0, 4) (a) Represent this game in normal form by using a matrix, and find all pure strategy (Bayesian Nash equilibrium (equilibria) b) Does a pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium exist? If so, show it (or them). If not, prove it.

Answer 1

Ans As the a​bove table shows pure strategies of the game player 2  

Player 1	L	M	R
A	0,4	0,1	4,0
B	4,0	0,1	0,4

ans (b) there is no Nash equilibrium in the game because there is no dominant strategy in the game player 1 chooses A while player 2 choose the L the payoffs will be (0,4) in the same manner if player 1 chooses B and player 2 choose L the payoffs will be (4,0) so the player 1 chooses B as there payoffs is greater but in the whole process there is dominant strategy in this game .