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Problem 3 Consider the following sequential game between Kate and Nate. They each have to choose...
2. Consider the following sequential game. Player A can choose between two tasks, Tl and T2....
2. Consider the following sequential game. Player A can choose between two tasks, Tl and T2. After having observed the choice of A, Player B chooses between two projects Pl or P2. The payoffs are as follows: If A chooses TI and B chooses P1 the payoffs are (12, 8), where the first payoff is for A and the second for B; if A chooses T1 and B opts for P2 the payoffs are (20, 7); if A chooses T2...
2. Consider the following sequential game. Player A can choose between two tasks, TI and T2....
2. Consider the following sequential game. Player A can choose between two tasks, TI and T2. After having observed the choice of A, Player B chooses between two projects P1 or P2. The payoffs are as follows: If A chooses TI and B chooses Pl the payoffs are (12.8), where the first payoff is for A and the second for B; if A chooses TI and B opts for P2 the payoffs are (20,7); if A chooses T2 and B...
Consider the following game: there are two players, an incumbent (denoted I) and a potential entrant...
Consider the following game: there are two players, an incumbent (denoted I) and a potential entrant (denoted E) to the market. The entrant has two actions: it can either enter the market in which the incumbent operates, or not enter. The incumbent has two actions: it can either fight the entrant, or accommodate. The payoffs are as follows: if E enters and I fights, E gets -1 and I gets 2. If E does not enter, I gets 10 for...
6. Consider a sequential game with 3 players. Player 1 can choose A or B. Player...
6. Consider a sequential game with 3 players. Player 1 can choose A or B. Player 2 can choose C, D, E, or F (depending on what player 1 chooses). Player 3 can choose G, H, I, J, K, L, M, or N (depending on what player 1 and 2 choose). Player 1 (P1) goes first, player 2 (P2) goes second, and player 3 (P3) goes third. Payoffs are written as the payoffs for P1, P2, and the for P3....
4. Consider the following game that is played T times. First, players move simultaneously and independently....
4. Consider the following game that is played T times. First, players move simultaneously and independently. Then each player is informed about the actions taken by the other player in the first play and, given this, they play it again, and so on. The payoff for the whole game is the sum of the payoffs a player obtains in the T plays of the game A 3,1 4,0 0,1 В 1,5 2,2 0,1 C 1,1 0,2 1,2 (a) (10%) Suppose...
3. (30 pts) Consider the following game. Players can choose either left () or 'right' (r) The tab...
3. (30 pts) Consider the following game. Players can choose either left () or 'right' (r) The table provided below gives the payoffs to player A and B given any set of choices, where player A's payoff is the firat number and player B's payoff is the second number Player B Player A 4,4 1,6 r 6,1 -3.-3 (a) Solve for the pure strategy Nash equilibria. (4 pta) (b) Suppose player A chooses l with probability p and player B...
Problem 3 - Battle of the sexes with a first mover Consider once again Tony and...
Problem 3 - Battle of the sexes with a first mover Consider once again Tony and Maria and their movie night coordination game. Tony and Maria have different preferences for movies. Tony prefers Action movies over Comedies. Maria prefers Comedies to Action movies. They prefer to watch movies together rather than separately. The payoff matrix is as follows. Table 1: Tony and Maria payoffs Tony Action Comedy Action 2,5 -1,-1 Maria Comedy 1.1 5,2 1. Determine all the pure strategy...
5. Consider the following game matrix of payoffs: M t 1,1 5,4 4,6 0,2 4,7 3,1...
5. Consider the following game matrix of payoffs: M t 1,1 5,4 4,6 0,2 4,7 3,1 3,0 b 2,0 2,12 Find the pure strategy Nash Equi libria for the above game, ass uming that it is a simultaneo us a) move game. b) Suppose Column moves first, and Row moves sequentially after that. Draw a game tree and solve for the equilibrium path. Would Column want to move first? Would Row want to let them? c) Answer the same questions...
Consider a game between an employer (E) and a worker (W). The worker can choose to...
Consider a game between an employer (E) and a worker (W). The worker can choose to work hard (H) or slack (S); the employer can dock the worker's pay (D) or not (N). The worker gets enjoyment worth a 1 from slacking, but hurt worth − 2 from docked pay. Thus, a worker who works hard and whose pay is not docked gets a 0; one who slacks and whose pay is docked gets 1 − 2 = −1; and...
(2) Consider the following game: P U M D LR 3,1 0,2 1,2 1,1 0,4 3,1...
(2) Consider the following game: P U M D LR 3,1 0,2 1,2 1,1 0,4 3,1 (a) Show that M is a dominated strategy when mixed strategies are used. (b) Using the observation in part (a) above, find the mixed strategy NE for this game. (3) (Bertrand Model with sequential move) Consider a Bertrand duopoly model with two firms, F and F2 selling two varieties of a product. The demand curve for Fi's product 91 (P1.p2) = 10 - P1...
2. Consider the following sequential game. Player A can choose between two tasks, Tl and T2. After having observed the choice of A, Player B chooses between two projects Pl or P2. The payoffs are as follows: If A chooses TI and B chooses P1 the payoffs are (12, 8), where the first payoff is for A and the second for B; if A chooses T1 and B opts for P2 the payoffs are (20, 7); if A chooses T2...
2. Consider the following sequential game. Player A can choose between two tasks, TI and T2. After having observed the choice of A, Player B chooses between two projects P1 or P2. The payoffs are as follows: If A chooses TI and B chooses Pl the payoffs are (12.8), where the first payoff is for A and the second for B; if A chooses TI and B opts for P2 the payoffs are (20,7); if A chooses T2 and B...
4. Consider the following game that is played T times. First, players move simultaneously and independently. Then each player is informed about the actions taken by the other player in the first play and, given this, they play it again, and so on. The payoff for the whole game is the sum of the payoffs a player obtains in the T plays of the game A 3,1 4,0 0,1 В 1,5 2,2 0,1 C 1,1 0,2 1,2 (a) (10%) Suppose...
3. (30 pts) Consider the following game. Players can choose either left () or 'right' (r) The table provided below gives the payoffs to player A and B given any set of choices, where player A's payoff is the firat number and player B's payoff is the second number Player B Player A 4,4 1,6 r 6,1 -3.-3 (a) Solve for the pure strategy Nash equilibria. (4 pta) (b) Suppose player A chooses l with probability p and player B...
Problem 3 - Battle of the sexes with a first mover Consider once again Tony and Maria and their movie night coordination game. Tony and Maria have different preferences for movies. Tony prefers Action movies over Comedies. Maria prefers Comedies to Action movies. They prefer to watch movies together rather than separately. The payoff matrix is as follows. Table 1: Tony and Maria payoffs Tony Action Comedy Action 2,5 -1,-1 Maria Comedy 1.1 5,2 1. Determine all the pure strategy...
5. Consider the following game matrix of payoffs: M t 1,1 5,4 4,6 0,2 4,7 3,1 3,0 b 2,0 2,12 Find the pure strategy Nash Equi libria for the above game, ass uming that it is a simultaneo us a) move game. b) Suppose Column moves first, and Row moves sequentially after that. Draw a game tree and solve for the equilibrium path. Would Column want to move first? Would Row want to let them? c) Answer the same questions...
(2) Consider the following game: P U M D LR 3,1 0,2 1,2 1,1 0,4 3,1 (a) Show that M is a dominated strategy when mixed strategies are used. (b) Using the observation in part (a) above, find the mixed strategy NE for this game. (3) (Bertrand Model with sequential move) Consider a Bertrand duopoly model with two firms, F and F2 selling two varieties of a product. The demand curve for Fi's product 91 (P1.p2) = 10 - P1...
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