The market demand function is
Q = 10000 - 1000p
Each firm has a marginal cost of m=$0.28. Firm 1, the leader, acts before Firm 2, the follower. Solve for the Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium quantities, prices, and profits. Compare your solution to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium quantities are
q1 = ____ units and q2= ____ units. (Enter your responses as whole numbers.)
The Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium price is:
p=$_____________
Profits for the firms are
profit1=$_______________
and profit2=$_______________
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities are:
q1=______________units
and q2=______________units
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium price is:
p=$______________
Profits for the firms are
profit1=$_____________ and profit2=$_______________
The market demand function is Q = 10000 - 1000p Each firm has a marginal cost...
Duopoly quantity-setting firms face the market demand p=210-Q. Each firm has a marginal cost of $15 per unit. What is the Cournot equilibrium? The Cournot Equilibrium quantities for Firm 1 (q1) and Firm 2 (q2) are: q1= __ units and q2 =__ units . (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places.) The Cournot equilibrium price is p=$__ (two decimal places)
Duopoly quantity-setting firms face the market demand p 270-Q Each firm has a marginal cost of $15 per unit What is the Coumot equilibrium? The Cournot equilibrium quantities for Firm 1 (q1) and Firm 2 (42) are -85 units 02- 85units. (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places.) 10 and PM The Cournot equilbrium price is he Counot equilibrium? mot equilibrium quantities for Firm 1 (91) and Firm 2 (42) are 1 85 units 2 85...
2. Consider a Cournot dupoly, but assume that demand is p(q) = 12 – 9 (ignoring non-negativity) and and unit cost c= 3. Again, firms simultaneously pick quantities qı > 0 and q2 > 0 and the price is set to clear the market given the quantities chosen. 1. Write down the optimization problems that define the best responses, solve explicitly for the best response functions, and find all Nash equilibria. 2. Formulate the problem for a cartel that maximizes...
A duopoly faces a market demand of p 180-Q. Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of Mc1 -S20. Firm 2s constant marginal cost is MC2 $40. Calculate the output of each firm, market output, and price if there is (a) a collusive equilibrium or (b) a Cournot equilibrium The collusive equilibrium occurs where q, equals and q2 equals (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places) Market output is The collusive equilibrium price is S The...
2*. Consider a market with two firms where the inverse demand function is given by p = 28 - 2q and where q = q1 + q2. Each firm has the total cost function c(qi) = 4qi, where i = {1,2}. a) Compare price level, quantities and profits in this market calculating the Cournot equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium. Draw a graph with best response functions and illustrate the Cournot and Stackelberg solutions in that graph. b) Compare your solutions...
2*. Consider a market with two firms where the inverse demand function is given by p = 28 - 2q and where q = q1 + q2. Each firm has the total cost function c(qi) = 4qi, where i = {1,2}. a) Compare price level, quantities and profits in this market calculating the Cournot equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium. Draw a graph with best response functions and illustrate the Cournot and Stackelberg solutions in that graph. b) Compare your solutions...
2*. Consider a market with two firms where the inverse demand function is given by p = 28 - 2q and where q = q1 + q2. Each firm has the total cost function c(qi) = 4qi, where i = {1,2}. a) Compare price level, quantities and profits in this market calculating the Cournot equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium. Draw a graph with best response functions and illustrate the Cournot and Stackelberg solutions in that graph. b) Compare your solutions...
Reference the following information about the market demand function for questions 1 to 15. These questions are on different types of market structures – monopoly, perfect competition, Cournot oligopoly market, and the Stackelberg oligopoly market. The market demand function is given the following equation: P = 1600 – Q where Q is the industry’s output level. Suppose initially this market is served by a single firm. Let the total cost function of this firm be given the function C(Q) =...
Suppose two firms (Firm 1 and Firm 2) are producing a product. The total demand is: Q = 110 –10P, where Q = Q1 + Q2. Each of the two firms has the cost function TC = 5Q. Based on the information given, calculate the equilibrium P, Q, Q1, Q2, Profit1 and Profit2 under monopoly (collusion), Cournot, and Stackelberg. For the Stackelberg model, assume that Firm 1 is the leader and Firm 2 is the follower. Show all your workings...
Please be descriptive. The market demand curve in a commodity chemical industry is given by Q 600 - 3P, where Q is the quantity demanded per month and P is the market price in dollars. Firms in this industry supply quantities every month, and the resulting market price occurs at the point at which the quantity demanded equals the total quantity supplied. Suppose there are two firms in this industry, Firm 1 and Firm 2. Each firm has an identical...