Homework Answers
Since Alice prefers Ballet and Bob prefers Soccer or vice versa and thus both can go seperately.
However presuming they both are in love they would go together to watch either ballet or soccer at same time and thus we have two Nash equilibria at (Ballet,Ballet) = (2,1) and (Soccer, Soccer) =(1, 2).
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Bob Ballet Alice Ballet Soccer 2,1 Soccer 0,0 1,2 0,0 Question 9a: In the above game...
Problem 1. (20 points) Consider a game with two players, Alice and Bob. Alice can choose...
Problem 1. (20 points) Consider a game with two players, Alice and Bob. Alice can choose A or B. The game ends if she chooses A while it continues to Bob if she chooses B. Bob then can choose C or D. If he chooses C the game ends, and if he chooses D the game continues to Alice. Finally, Alice can choose E or F and the game ends after each of these choices. a. Present this game as...
4) (20 points) Consider the following two player simultaneous move game which is another version of...
4) (20 points) Consider the following two player simultaneous move game which is another version of the Battle of the Sexes game. Bob Opera Alice 4,1 Opera Football Football 0,0 1,4 0,0 Suppose Alice plays a p - mix in which she plays Opera with probability p and Football with probability (1 – p) and Bob plays a q- mix in which he plays Opera with probability q and Football with probability (1 – 9). a) Find the mixed strategy...
-wy uit above gamd 2 R 5,5 0.0 8,2 0,0 Question 10a: Indicate all of the...
-wy uit above gamd 2 R 5,5 0.0 8,2 0,0 Question 10a: Indicate all of the subgames in the above game. Question 10d: Find the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in the above game.
1 pts Question 8 U Player 2 L R U 2.0 2,1 Player 1 D 3,1...
1 pts Question 8 U Player 2 L R U 2.0 2,1 Player 1 D 3,1 1,2 The above figure shows the payoff matrix for two players, Player 1 and Player 2. Player 1's payoff is listed first in each cell. A Nash equilibrium of this game is that Player 1 chooses and Player 2 chooses L. Player 1 chooses and Player 2 chooses R. Player 1 chooses and Player 2 chooses L. Player 1 chooses U and Player 2...
(2) Consider the following game: P U M D LR 3,1 0,2 1,2 1,1 0,4 3,1...
(2) Consider the following game: P U M D LR 3,1 0,2 1,2 1,1 0,4 3,1 (a) Show that M is a dominated strategy when mixed strategies are used. (b) Using the observation in part (a) above, find the mixed strategy NE for this game. (3) (Bertrand Model with sequential move) Consider a Bertrand duopoly model with two firms, F and F2 selling two varieties of a product. The demand curve for Fi's product 91 (P1.p2) = 10 - P1...
Problem 1. (20 points) Consider a game with two players, Alice and Bob. Alice can choose A or B. The game ends if she chooses A while it continues to Bob if she chooses B. Bob then can choose C or D. If he chooses C the game ends, and if he chooses D the game continues to Alice. Finally, Alice can choose E or F and the game ends after each of these choices. a. Present this game as...
4) (20 points) Consider the following two player simultaneous move game which is another version of the Battle of the Sexes game. Bob Opera Alice 4,1 Opera Football Football 0,0 1,4 0,0 Suppose Alice plays a p - mix in which she plays Opera with probability p and Football with probability (1 – p) and Bob plays a q- mix in which he plays Opera with probability q and Football with probability (1 – 9). a) Find the mixed strategy...
-wy uit above gamd 2 R 5,5 0.0 8,2 0,0 Question 10a: Indicate all of the subgames in the above game. Question 10d: Find the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in the above game.
1 pts Question 8 U Player 2 L R U 2.0 2,1 Player 1 D 3,1 1,2 The above figure shows the payoff matrix for two players, Player 1 and Player 2. Player 1's payoff is listed first in each cell. A Nash equilibrium of this game is that Player 1 chooses and Player 2 chooses L. Player 1 chooses and Player 2 chooses R. Player 1 chooses and Player 2 chooses L. Player 1 chooses U and Player 2...
(2) Consider the following game: P U M D LR 3,1 0,2 1,2 1,1 0,4 3,1 (a) Show that M is a dominated strategy when mixed strategies are used. (b) Using the observation in part (a) above, find the mixed strategy NE for this game. (3) (Bertrand Model with sequential move) Consider a Bertrand duopoly model with two firms, F and F2 selling two varieties of a product. The demand curve for Fi's product 91 (P1.p2) = 10 - P1...
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