7and8 7. Let the cost function of a monopolist be c()-100+20q. Find the market equilibrium, price...
8 7. Let the cost function of a monopolist be c()-100+20q. Find the market equilibrium, price elasticity of demand at the equilibrjum, profit, and DWL if (a) market demand is p-100-q (b) market demand is q-120-2p St. 8. There are two identical firms in the market. Each firm has cost function c(g)-24q and the market demand is p-60-q. The two firms are considering whether to produce at cooperative output level (cartel) or to set output level non-cooperatively (Cournot). (a) Find...
4、5and 6 thanks 1. Let the production function beq(: capital, L: labor), the unit prices of capital and labor ba both SI 28 (a) Find the cost function. (b) If the firm with this production function is in a competitive market and the market price is $12, how many units of products should the firm produce? -6 2. (a) Let the cost function be C(ą)-F+mq (i) Is there economies of scale? (i) If market price is equal to margiial cost,...
sixth question change in the profit of each firm rom (1 (iii) What is the percentage 4. (a) There is only one firm in a market. This firm has 100 plants, each produces according to cos function c(q) q2 The market demand is p = 18-100 Find the price, output and profit. (b) If each plant in (a) is now controlled by different owners and they behave competitively, find th market price and market output. (c) How much is the...
the fifth question change in the profit of each firm rom (1 (iii) What is the percentage 4. (a) There is only one firm in a market. This firm has 100 plants, each produces according to cos function c(q) q2 The market demand is p = 18-100 Find the price, output and profit. (b) If each plant in (a) is now controlled by different owners and they behave competitively, find th market price and market output. (c) How much is...
the fourth question change in the profit of each firm rom (1 (iii) What is the percentage 4. (a) There is only one firm in a market. This firm has 100 plants, each produces according to cos function c(q) q2 The market demand is p = 18-100 Find the price, output and profit. (b) If each plant in (a) is now controlled by different owners and they behave competitively, find th market price and market output. (c) How much is...
2. (30 pts) There are two firms in a market, producing the same good. The firms simultaneously choose their output levels, qı for firm 1 and q2 for firm 2. The price adjusts according to the inverse demand function p= 65 – (91 +92). Each firm has a per-unit (average) cost of 5. Each firm's payoff is its profit. a. (5 pts) Find firm l's profit as a function of qı and q2 (profit equals revenue minus total cost). b....
third question the answer on the paper process 1. Let the production function beq Kili (K: capital, L: labor), the unit prices of capital and labor be both $1. (a) Find the cost function. 2b (b) If the firm with this production function is in a competitive market an many units of products should the firm produce? d the market price is S12, how 2. (a) Let the cost function be C(g)-F+mq G Is there economies of scale? (ii) If...
Suppose that the (inverse) market demand function for wax paper is P=400-2Q where Q is total industry output. There are only two firms, Firm1 and Firm 2, that produce wax paper. Thus, Q=q1+q2. Each firm has no fixed cost but a constant marginal cost of production equals $40. (a) Suppose that the two firms decide to form a cartel. Calculate the output quantity for Firm 1 (b) Suppose that the two firms decide to form a cartel. Calculate the profit...
Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(Q) 9) = 3Q?. Suppose that firm 1 in the market described in question 1 has first mover advantage. (Market demand is Q 18 – P and both firms have the same cost C(Q) - Q? a. What do we call a market where two firms move sequentially? b. Set up and solve for firm l's output, firm 2's output, market output, and equilibrium price. Show...
Consider a market with demand function D(p)=10-p and firms with constant marginal cost MC=1. Assume that there is no fixed cost and thus C(q1)=q1and C(q2)=q2 2. Suppose the owners of the two firms meet together secretly and agree to form a cartel. They choose a total level of production that maximizes their joint profits. They agree to split production and thus profits) equally (a) Suppose that both firms abide by their secret agreement. How much will each firm produce? What...