Homework Answers
c vs. d, then winner vs. b, then winner vs. a
(Between c vs d, c will win as voter 1 and 2 prefer c over d,
then between c vs b, b wins as voter 1 and voter 3 prefers b over
c, then between b vs a a will win as voter 1 and 2 prefer a over b.
So, social choice is a.
In all other cases, a will not be the social choice because a is
put against c in all the other options at some point and between a
and c, c is will win as c is preferred over a by voter 2 and 3)
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please explain why
Suppose that we have three voters and four alternatives, and suppose the individual...
please explain why Suppose that we have seven voters and five alternatives, and suppose that the...
please explain why
Suppose that we have seven voters and five alternatives, and suppose that the individual preference lists are as follows: Voter 1: abcde Voter 2: adbec Voter 3: adbec Voter 4: cbdea Voter 5: cd ba e Voter 6:bcdae Voter 7: ecdba What social preference list results from iterating the plurality procedure? abcde ad bec a, b, c, d, and e are all tied a; then b, c, and d are tied; then e.
There are 100 voters and three alternative restaurants: Dylan's Pizza, Elise's Thai, and Frank's Fish. In...
There are 100 voters and three alternative restaurants: Dylan's Pizza, Elise's Thai, and Frank's Fish. In Situation 1, the individual preference lists are as follows: Voters 1-49: Dylan's Pizza, Frank's Fish, Elise's Thai Voters 50-75: Elise's Thai, Dylan's Pizza, Frank's Fish Voters 76-100: Frank's Fish, Elise's Thai, Dylan's Pizza In Situation 2, the individual preference lists are as follows: Voters 1-47: Dylan's Pizza, Frank's Fish, Elise's Thai Voters 48-49: Frank's Fish, Dylan's Pizza, Elise's Thai Voters 50-75: Elise's Thai, Dylan's...
26. Consider the following preference profile: No. of Votes 8 7 7 5 5 4 4...
26. Consider the following preference profile: No. of Votes 8 7 7 5 5 4 4 Rank 1 AA BBCCD 2 DBC CBDC 3 B C D A D B B 4 CD A D A A A (3 marks) Using sequential pairwise voting with the agenda A, B, C, D, Using sequential pairwise voting with the agenda A, B, C, D, we have a unique winner D. we have a unique winner B. o we have a unique winner...
QUESTION 1 Assume you have a world with 65 voters which can be grouped into four...
QUESTION 1 Assume you have a world with 65 voters which can be grouped into four different voter types based on their preferences over four options {A, B, C, and D). The table below shows how many voters are in each group and what the preferences over those options are for the voters within that group. Vater Type 1 Voter Type 2 Voter Type 3 Vater Type 4 20 Most Preferred 15 21 Least Preferred In other words, there are...
1. Throughout this question, assume that you are one of only three voters. Suppose voters are...
1. Throughout this question, assume that you are one of only three voters. Suppose voters are only concerned with the quality of candidates. In particular, let q R L be the difference in quality between candidate R and candidate L. There is no cost of voting and the utility is equal to one if the higher quality candidate wins and zero otherwise The winner is determined by majority rule. When q is observable, each voter votes for the higher quality...
1. Throughout this question, assume that you are one of only three voters. Suppose voters are...
1. Throughout this question, assume that you are one of only three voters. Suppose voters are only concerned with the quality of candidates. In particular, let q R L be the difference in quality between candidate R and candidate L. There is no cost of voting and the utility is equal to one if the higher quality candidate wins and zero otherwise The winner is determined by majority rule. When q is observable, each voter votes for the higher quality...
1. Throughout this question, assume that you are one of only three voters. Suppose voters are...
1. Throughout this question, assume that you are one of only three voters. Suppose voters are only concerned with the quality of candidates. In particular, let q R L be the difference in quality between candidate R and candidate L. There is no cost of voting and the utility is equal to one if the higher quality candidate wins and zero otherwise The winner is determined by majority rule. When q is observable, each voter votes for the higher quality...
Public Finance Suppose a community is considering three projects: A, B, and C. The com- munity...
Public Finance
Suppose a community is considering three projects: A, B, and C. The
com-
munity consists of three voters: 1, 2, and 3. Table 1.3 shows their
net benefits from each project:
from each project: Table 1.3: Benefit Matrix Project Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter 3 B 50 200 100 300 150 200 C -450 -100 500 . a. Plot the preferences of each voter on a graph. b. Do you expect any anomalies during a pairwise voting process?...
please answer all questions 18. We mentioned that the median voter theorem doesn't always work, and...
please answer all questions
18. We mentioned that the median voter theorem doesn't always work, and sometimes a winning policy doesn't exist. This fact has driven economists and political scientists to write thousands of papers and books, both proving that fact and also trying to find good workarounds. The most famous theoretical example of how voting doesn't work is the Condorcet paradox. The Marquis de Condorcet, a French nobleman in the 1700s, wondered what would happen if three voters had...
Voting
Voting systems based on majority rule are susceptible to strategic agenda-setting. Let’s explore how one might do this on some basic examples. 1. Suppose there are four alternatives, named A, B, C, and D. There are three voters who have the following individual rankings: That is, we have: C ≻1 D ≻1 A ≻1 B D ≻2 A ≻2 C ≻2 B B ≻3 C ≻3 D ≻3 A You’re in charge of designing an agenda for considering the alternatives...
please explain why
Suppose that we have seven voters and five alternatives, and suppose that the individual preference lists are as follows: Voter 1: abcde Voter 2: adbec Voter 3: adbec Voter 4: cbdea Voter 5: cd ba e Voter 6:bcdae Voter 7: ecdba What social preference list results from iterating the plurality procedure? abcde ad bec a, b, c, d, and e are all tied a; then b, c, and d are tied; then e.
There are 100 voters and three alternative restaurants: Dylan's Pizza, Elise's Thai, and Frank's Fish. In Situation 1, the individual preference lists are as follows: Voters 1-49: Dylan's Pizza, Frank's Fish, Elise's Thai Voters 50-75: Elise's Thai, Dylan's Pizza, Frank's Fish Voters 76-100: Frank's Fish, Elise's Thai, Dylan's Pizza In Situation 2, the individual preference lists are as follows: Voters 1-47: Dylan's Pizza, Frank's Fish, Elise's Thai Voters 48-49: Frank's Fish, Dylan's Pizza, Elise's Thai Voters 50-75: Elise's Thai, Dylan's...
26. Consider the following preference profile: No. of Votes 8 7 7 5 5 4 4 Rank 1 AA BBCCD 2 DBC CBDC 3 B C D A D B B 4 CD A D A A A (3 marks) Using sequential pairwise voting with the agenda A, B, C, D, Using sequential pairwise voting with the agenda A, B, C, D, we have a unique winner D. we have a unique winner B. o we have a unique winner...
QUESTION 1 Assume you have a world with 65 voters which can be grouped into four different voter types based on their preferences over four options {A, B, C, and D). The table below shows how many voters are in each group and what the preferences over those options are for the voters within that group. Vater Type 1 Voter Type 2 Voter Type 3 Vater Type 4 20 Most Preferred 15 21 Least Preferred In other words, there are...
1. Throughout this question, assume that you are one of only three voters. Suppose voters are only concerned with the quality of candidates. In particular, let q R L be the difference in quality between candidate R and candidate L. There is no cost of voting and the utility is equal to one if the higher quality candidate wins and zero otherwise The winner is determined by majority rule. When q is observable, each voter votes for the higher quality...
1. Throughout this question, assume that you are one of only three voters. Suppose voters are only concerned with the quality of candidates. In particular, let q R L be the difference in quality between candidate R and candidate L. There is no cost of voting and the utility is equal to one if the higher quality candidate wins and zero otherwise The winner is determined by majority rule. When q is observable, each voter votes for the higher quality...
1. Throughout this question, assume that you are one of only three voters. Suppose voters are only concerned with the quality of candidates. In particular, let q R L be the difference in quality between candidate R and candidate L. There is no cost of voting and the utility is equal to one if the higher quality candidate wins and zero otherwise The winner is determined by majority rule. When q is observable, each voter votes for the higher quality...
Public Finance
Suppose a community is considering three projects: A, B, and C. The
com-
munity consists of three voters: 1, 2, and 3. Table 1.3 shows their
net benefits from each project:
from each project: Table 1.3: Benefit Matrix Project Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter 3 B 50 200 100 300 150 200 C -450 -100 500 . a. Plot the preferences of each voter on a graph. b. Do you expect any anomalies during a pairwise voting process?...
please answer all questions
18. We mentioned that the median voter theorem doesn't always work, and sometimes a winning policy doesn't exist. This fact has driven economists and political scientists to write thousands of papers and books, both proving that fact and also trying to find good workarounds. The most famous theoretical example of how voting doesn't work is the Condorcet paradox. The Marquis de Condorcet, a French nobleman in the 1700s, wondered what would happen if three voters had...
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