Question

There are 100 voters and three alternative restaurants: Dylan's Pizza, Elise's Thai, and Frank's Fish. In Situation 1, the individual preference lists are as follows: Voters 1-49: Dylan's Pizza, Frank's Fish, Elise's Thai Voters 50-75: Elise's Thai, Dylan's Pizza, Frank's Fish Voters 76-100: Frank's Fish, Elise's Thai, Dylan's Pizza In Situation 2, the individual preference lists are as follows: Voters 1-47: Dylan's Pizza, Frank's Fish, Elise's Thai Voters 48-49: Frank's Fish, Dylan's Pizza, Elise's Thai Voters 50-75: Elise's Thai, Dylan's Pizza, Frank's Fish Voters 76-100: Frank's Fish, Elise's Thai, Dylan's Pizza We can use those two situations to demonstrate which of the following statements? The Borda count procedure fails to satisfy the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives property. The Condorcet procedure fails to satisfy the Pareto property. Plurality voting fails to satisfy the Pareto property. The Hare (instant runoff) system fails to satisfy the monotonicity property. Plurality voting fails to satisfy the monotonicity property.

Answer 1

1. Option D because voters moves a winner higher up on his preference list, the outcome should still have the same winner

2. Option B