Question

How to do the c and d?

Player 2 A-1,-1 0,0 0,0 0,0 5,5 Player 1 B 0,0 ci 0,0 0,0 Figure 2: A 3-by-3 Game (a) (2 points) First, what category of game does this fall into (e.g. prisoners dilemma)? (b) (3 points) Next, find all of the Nash equilibria in this game, being careful to explain (c) (5 points) Which of the Nash equilibria is the best? Which is the worst? Justify Explain. the associated beliefs your answers carefully; notice that we havent said anything about whether we can compare payoffs across individuals here (d) (5 points) Under what situations might the best equilibrium be played? The worst? How is this related to how the Player feel about one another? How is this manifested in their beliefs? Explain.

0 0
Add a comment Improve this question Transcribed image text
Answer #1

Nash equilibrium of the game is (B,B) and (C,C)

c)

Best NE - (C,C)

Worst NE - (B,B)

This is so because playing (C,C) will give a payoff of 5 to each player.

(B, B) is worst NE because each player gets only a payoff of 1.

Deviating from either outcomes give a payoff of zero to that player if other players continue to act in the same way.

d)

If the row player believes that column player is trustworthy and will choose to cooperate to gain higher payoff, it will choose to do the same. Thus best NE (C,C) arises.

On the other hand, if there are low levels of trust and players have incentive to deviate or cause harm to other, it will choose to deviate too and hence (B, B) NE arises.

Add a comment
Know the answer?
Add Answer to:
How to do the c and d? Player 2 A-1,-1 0,0 0,0 0,0 5,5 Player 1...
Your Answer:

Post as a guest

Your Name:

What's your source?

Earn Coins

Coins can be redeemed for fabulous gifts.

Not the answer you're looking for? Ask your own homework help question. Our experts will answer your question WITHIN MINUTES for Free.
Similar Homework Help Questions
  • Question 1 a) First consider the following game, where each player plays either C (Confess) or D ...

    Question 1 a) First consider the following game, where each player plays either C (Confess) or D (Deny) and the numbers in brackets are the respective payoffs to player 1 and player 2. Player 2 Player 1 (0-12) (-12,0) In relation to the above game outline the concepts of - Dominated strategies - Best responses - Nash equilibrium/equilibria - A prisoner's dilemma b) Define what is meant by subgame perfection and how the concept of credibility can be used to...

  • Question 3 Consider the game in figure 3. Player 2 LR 3,3 1,4 Player 1 4,1...

    Question 3 Consider the game in figure 3. Player 2 LR 3,3 1,4 Player 1 4,1 2,2 Figure 3: A Prisoner's Dilemma game. Assume that the payoffs in the figure are $ values. (i) Assume that both players have risk neutral utility functions. Find all of the Nash equilibria of this game. (ii) Next, assume that the row player has other regarding preferences with a = 0 and B = 3 (while the column player has the same preferences as...

  • Technology Adoption: During the adoption of a new technology a CEO (player 1) can design a...

    Technology Adoption: During the adoption of a new technology a CEO (player 1) can design a new task for a division manager. The new task can be either high level (H) or low level (L). The manager simultaneously chooses to invest in good training (G) or bad training (B). The payoffs from this interaction are given by the following matrix: Player 2 GB 5,4 -5,2 H Player 1 L 2, -2 0,0 a. Present the game in extensive form (a...

  • 3. Player 1 and Player 2 are going to play the following stage game twice:       &n...

    3. Player 1 and Player 2 are going to play the following stage game twice:                                 Player 2 Left Middle Right Player 1 Top 4, 3 0, 0 1, 4 Bottom 0, 0 2, 1 0, 0 There is no discounting in this problem and so a player’s payoff in this repeated game is the sum of her payoffs in the two plays of the stage game. (a) Find the Nash equilibria of the stage game. Is (Top, Left) a...

  • 8. Consider the two-player game described by the payoff matrix below. Player B L R Player...

    8. Consider the two-player game described by the payoff matrix below. Player B L R Player A D 0,0 4,4 (a) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria for this game. (b) This game also has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium; find the probabilities the players use in this equilibrium, together with an explanation for your answer (c) Keeping in mind Schelling's focal point idea from Chapter 6, what equilibrium do you think is the best prediction of how the game will be...

  • First part: Consider the following two-player game. The players simultaneously and independently announce an integer number...

    First part: Consider the following two-player game. The players simultaneously and independently announce an integer number between 1 and 100, and each player's payoff is the product of the two numbers announced. (a) Describe the best responses of this game. How many Nash equilibria does the game have? Explain. (b) Now, consider the following variation of the game: first, Player 1 can choose either to "Stop" or "Con- tinue". If she chooses "Stop", then the game ends with the pair...

  • MicroEcon True/False Problem 1: True/False/Uncertain (20 points) Please fully explain your answer. Points are awarded based...

    MicroEcon True/False Problem 1: True/False/Uncertain (20 points) Please fully explain your answer. Points are awarded based on explanations. 1. (4 points) In a two-player game, a Nash equilibrium is the outcome that maximizes the sum of the players' payoffs. 2. (4 points) In a Nash equilibrium in a two-player game, both players must have selected a dominant strategy. 3. (4 points) Repeatedly playing the Prisoner's Dilemma may or may not result in a cooperative solution. 4. (4 points) In the...

  • Player 2 Left Right Up (4,3)    (-1, -1) Player 1 (bold) Down (0,0) (3,4) Refer...

    Player 2 Left Right Up (4,3)    (-1, -1) Player 1 (bold) Down (0,0) (3,4) Refer to the payoff matrix above. How many Nash Equilibriums this game has? A.1 B.2 C.0 D.3

  • player 2 H T player 1 H 1,-1 -1,1 T -1,1 1,-1 Consider a game of...

    player 2 H T player 1 H 1,-1 -1,1 T -1,1 1,-1 Consider a game of matching pennies as described above. If the pennies match player 2 pays player 1 $1 (both get head or tail). If the pennies are not matched player 1 pays player 2 $1 ( head , tail or tail , head). H represents heads and T represents Tails 1. (2 points) What is the set of strategies for each player? 2. (5 points) Is there...

  • 3. (Level A) Suppose the following Prisoner's Dilemma is repeated infinitely: 112 C D C 2,...

    3. (Level A) Suppose the following Prisoner's Dilemma is repeated infinitely: 112 C D C 2, 2 0, 3 D 3,0 1, 1 Let uj be the payoff to player i in period t. Player i (i-1,2) maximizes her average discounted sum of payoffs, given by ( where o is the common discount factor of both players Suppose the players try to sustain (C, C) in each period by the Grim Trigger strategy. That is, each player plays the following...

ADVERTISEMENT
Free Homework Help App
Download From Google Play
Scan Your Homework
to Get Instant Free Answers
Need Online Homework Help?
Ask a Question
Get Answers For Free
Most questions answered within 3 hours.
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT