Question

Player 2 Left Right Up (4,3)    (-1, -1) Player 1 (bold) Down (0,0) (3,4) Refer...

Player 2

Left Right

Up (4,3)    (-1, -1)

Player 1 (bold)

Down (0,0) (3,4)

Refer to the payoff matrix above. How many Nash Equilibriums this game has?

A.1

B.2

C.0

D.3

0 0
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Answer #1

Nash Equilibrium is a collection of strategies in which there is one strategy for each player in such a manner that for each player in a game there is no benefit to switch strategies.          

We have the following information

Player 2

Left

Right

Player 1

Up

(4, 3)

(-1, -1)

Down

(0, 0)

(3, 4)

From the above one can see that, there are no Nash Equilibriums in this game. For instance, Player 1 will choose Up only if Player 2 choses Left. In case, Player 2 choses Right, then it is profitable for Player 1 to choose Down. So, in this game there is no strategy that dominates every other strategy for the players.

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