Again, consider the following payoff matrix: Player A Player B Left Right Up 1,1 1,2 Down...
Again, consider the following payoff matrix:
|
Player A |
Player B | ||
| Left | Right | ||
| Up | 1,1 | 1,2 | |
| Down | 2,1 | 2,2 | |
In regards to Nash equilibium, we can say that:
| A. |
there are two Nash equilibra; Down/Left and Up/Right |
|
| B. |
Bottom/Right is an unstable yet social optimum, therefore a Nash equilibrium |
|
| C. |
Bottom/Right is the only Nash equlibrium |
|
| D. |
there are zero Nash equilibria |
Homework Answers
Solution: there are two Nash equilibra; Down/Left and Up/Right
Explanation: Have applied the rule which state:
In the payoff pair of the cell, if the first payoff number, is the maximum of the column of the cell; and if the 2nd number is the maximum of the row of the cell then the cell indicates the Nash equilibrium. Thus there are two Nash equilibra; Down/Left i.e (2,1) and Up/Right i.e. (1,2)
Add Answer to:
Again, consider the following payoff matrix:
Player A
Player B
Left
Right
Up
1,1
1,2
Down...
Again, consider the following payoff matrix: Player A Player B Left Right Up 1,1 1,2 Down...
Again, consider the following payoff matrix: Player A Player B Left Right Up 1,1 1,2 Down 2,1 2,2 In regards to Nash equilibium, we can say that: A. there are two Nash equilibra; Down/Left and Up/Right B. Bottom/Right is an unstable yet social optimum, therefore a Nash equilibrium C. Bottom/Right is the only Nash equlibrium D. there are zero Nash equilibria
(Ch. 30) [Same Info] Consider the following payoff matrix. Player B Left Right Top 1,0 2,4...
(Ch. 30) [Same Info] Consider the following payoff matrix. Player B Left Right Top 1,0 2,4 Player Bottom • A Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies will have Player B playing Left_ _% of the time. 3,2 0,1 50
2. Consider the following simultaneous move game: Column Left Right Top 1,1 7,3 Row Bottom 3,5...
2. Consider the following simultaneous move game: Column Left Right Top 1,1 7,3 Row Bottom 3,5 11,0 (a) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria (b) Now assume that the game is made sequential with Row moving first. Illustrate this new game using a game tree and find the rollback equilibrium (c) List the strategies of the two players in this sequential-move game and give the normal-form representation of the game (the payoff matrix) (d) Use the payoff matrix to find the...
2. Consider the following simultaneous move game: Column Left Right 1,1 3,5 11,0 Тoр 7,3 Row...
2. Consider the following simultaneous move game: Column Left Right 1,1 3,5 11,0 Тoр 7,3 Row Bottom (a) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria (b) Now assume that the game is made sequential with Row moving first. Illustrate this new game using a game tree and find the rollback equilibrium (c) List the strategies of the two players in this sequential-move game and give the normal-form representation of the game (the payoff matrix) (d) Use the payoff matrix to find the...
2. (25 pts) Consider a two player game with a payoff matrix (1)/(2) L U D...
2. (25 pts) Consider a two player game with a payoff matrix (1)/(2) L U D R (2,1) (1,0) (0,0) (3,-4) where e E{-1,1} is a parameter known by player 2 only. Player 1 believes that 0 = 1 with probability 1/2 and 0 = -1 with probability 1/2. Everything above is common knowledge. (a) Write down the strategy space of each player. (b) Find the set of pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria.
Player 2 Left Right Up (4,3) (-1, -1) Player 1 (bold) Down (0,0) (3,4) Refer...
Player 2 Left Right Up (4,3) (-1, -1) Player 1 (bold) Down (0,0) (3,4) Refer to the payoff matrix above. How many Nash Equilibriums this game has? A.1 B.2 C.0 D.3
3. (30 pts) Consider the following game. Players can choose either left () or 'right' (r) The tab...
3. (30 pts) Consider the following game. Players can choose either left () or 'right' (r) The table provided below gives the payoffs to player A and B given any set of choices, where player A's payoff is the firat number and player B's payoff is the second number Player B Player A 4,4 1,6 r 6,1 -3.-3 (a) Solve for the pure strategy Nash equilibria. (4 pta) (b) Suppose player A chooses l with probability p and player B...
GAME MATRIX Consider two players (Rose as player 1 and Kalum as player 2) in which each player has 2 possible actions (...
GAME MATRIX
Consider two players (Rose as player 1 and Kalum as player 2) in which each player has 2 possible actions (Up or Down for Rose; Left or Right for Kalum. This can be represented by a 2x2 game with 8 different numbers (the payoffs). Write out three different games such that: (a) There are zero pure-strategy Nash equilibria. (b) There is exactly one pure-strategy equilibrium. (c) There are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
Consider two players (Rose as player...
8. Consider the two-player game described by the payoff matrix below. Player B L R Player...
8. Consider the two-player game described by the payoff matrix below. Player B L R Player A D 0,0 4,4 (a) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria for this game. (b) This game also has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium; find the probabilities the players use in this equilibrium, together with an explanation for your answer (c) Keeping in mind Schelling's focal point idea from Chapter 6, what equilibrium do you think is the best prediction of how the game will be...
3. Player 1 and Player 2 are going to play the following stage game twice: &n...
3. Player 1 and Player 2 are going to play the following stage
game twice:
Player 2
Left
Middle
Right
Player 1
Top
4, 3
0, 0
1, 4
Bottom
0, 0
2, 1
0, 0
There is no discounting in this problem and so a player’s payoff
in this repeated game is the sum of her payoffs in the two plays of
the stage game.
(a) Find the Nash equilibria of the stage game. Is (Top, Left) a...
(Ch. 30) [Same Info] Consider the following payoff matrix. Player B Left Right Top 1,0 2,4 Player Bottom • A Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies will have Player B playing Left_ _% of the time. 3,2 0,1 50
2. Consider the following simultaneous move game: Column Left Right Top 1,1 7,3 Row Bottom 3,5 11,0 (a) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria (b) Now assume that the game is made sequential with Row moving first. Illustrate this new game using a game tree and find the rollback equilibrium (c) List the strategies of the two players in this sequential-move game and give the normal-form representation of the game (the payoff matrix) (d) Use the payoff matrix to find the...
2. Consider the following simultaneous move game: Column Left Right 1,1 3,5 11,0 Тoр 7,3 Row Bottom (a) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria (b) Now assume that the game is made sequential with Row moving first. Illustrate this new game using a game tree and find the rollback equilibrium (c) List the strategies of the two players in this sequential-move game and give the normal-form representation of the game (the payoff matrix) (d) Use the payoff matrix to find the...
2. (25 pts) Consider a two player game with a payoff matrix (1)/(2) L U D R (2,1) (1,0) (0,0) (3,-4) where e E{-1,1} is a parameter known by player 2 only. Player 1 believes that 0 = 1 with probability 1/2 and 0 = -1 with probability 1/2. Everything above is common knowledge. (a) Write down the strategy space of each player. (b) Find the set of pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria.
3. (30 pts) Consider the following game. Players can choose either left () or 'right' (r) The table provided below gives the payoffs to player A and B given any set of choices, where player A's payoff is the firat number and player B's payoff is the second number Player B Player A 4,4 1,6 r 6,1 -3.-3 (a) Solve for the pure strategy Nash equilibria. (4 pta) (b) Suppose player A chooses l with probability p and player B...
GAME MATRIX
Consider two players (Rose as player 1 and Kalum as player 2) in which each player has 2 possible actions (Up or Down for Rose; Left or Right for Kalum. This can be represented by a 2x2 game with 8 different numbers (the payoffs). Write out three different games such that: (a) There are zero pure-strategy Nash equilibria. (b) There is exactly one pure-strategy equilibrium. (c) There are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
Consider two players (Rose as player...
8. Consider the two-player game described by the payoff matrix below. Player B L R Player A D 0,0 4,4 (a) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria for this game. (b) This game also has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium; find the probabilities the players use in this equilibrium, together with an explanation for your answer (c) Keeping in mind Schelling's focal point idea from Chapter 6, what equilibrium do you think is the best prediction of how the game will be...
3. Player 1 and Player 2 are going to play the following stage
game twice:
Player 2
Left
Middle
Right
Player 1
Top
4, 3
0, 0
1, 4
Bottom
0, 0
2, 1
0, 0
There is no discounting in this problem and so a player’s payoff
in this repeated game is the sum of her payoffs in the two plays of
the stage game.
(a) Find the Nash equilibria of the stage game. Is (Top, Left) a...
Most questions answered within 3 hours.
-
Accent Software faces the following conditions. All of these
support Accent’s use of a market-penetration pricing...
asked 8 minutes ago -
A mathematically inclined friend emails you the following
instructions: "Meet me in the cafeteria the first...
asked 11 minutes ago -
A monopoly sells in two countries . The demand curves in the two
countries are p1...
asked 1 hour ago -
A .15kg rubber ball is bounced off a wall. Before hitting the
wall, the ball moves...
asked 1 hour ago -
A manufacturing company preparing to build a new plant is
considering three potential locations for it....
asked 1 hour ago -
B. If compound Y has approximately the same values of solubility
in toluene as compound X,...
asked 2 hours ago -
Oscar Inc. has inventory in Japan valued at 39,051,000 Yen one
year ago. One year ago...
asked 2 hours ago -
If Canada suffered from "fundamental disequilibrium," and its
government choose not to devalue its currency, a...
asked 2 hours ago -
4. How many input & output Key Value Pairs are passed into,
and emitted out of...
asked 2 hours ago -
Why would your heart not function well if constructed of
skeletal muscle? What is the particular...
asked 2 hours ago -
Please respond to this essay question in full essay form for
Chemistry 1102 Organic and Biochemistry:...
asked 2 hours ago -
Determine the head loss and velocity of flow in a water supply main
of 15.0 cm...
asked 2 hours ago