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2. Consider the following simultaneous move game: Column Left Right 1,1 3,5 11,0 Тoр 7,3 Row Bottom (a) Find all pure-strateg

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Answer #1

A) NE

Left right
Top (1,1) (7,3•)
Bottom (3*,5•) (11*,0)

So NE: ( B, L)

* Shows BR of row player

& • shows BR of column player

​​​​

7 Row al Sequential ame game Otomo to tuma (161) (713) 1315) Cilio) To top B Botom y left Rt Right sowing Game backwards Row

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