1)
Player 1: the BOTTOM strategy has been dominated by the strategy TOP. Hence, BOTTOM strategy must be deleted.
Now moving to the player 2, the RIGHT strategy has been dominated by the strategy MIDDLE. Thus RIGHT must be deleted.
Now there are two Nash equilibrium:
( Middle: left) , (Too: Middle)
2)
Focal point is established where cooperation leads to maximum outcomes
Focal equilibrium is : ( Top: Middle)
Question 2(10 marks): The table below represents the pay-offs in a one-shot, simultaneous move game with...
1. (20 points) Consider the following game: Left 7,17 10,5 4,4 Top Middle Bottom Player B Middle 21,21 14,4 7,3 Right 14,11 4,3 10,25 Player A a. Does either player have a dominant strategy? What about a dominated strategy? b. What are the Nash equilibria of this game? C. Is there one Nash equilibrium that you think is a more likely outcome than the others? If so, why? If not, why not? d. Now suppose the game looks like this:...
2. consider the following simultaneous move game. Player B LEFT RIGHT Player A UP 4,1 1,4 DOWN 2,3 3,2 a. If there is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, what is it and what are the payoffs? b. If there is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, what is it and what are the expected payoffs? 3. Continue with the previous game but suppose this was a sequential game where Player A got to go first. a. Diagram the game...
2. Consider the following simultaneous move game: Column Left Right Top 1,1 7,3 Row Bottom 3,5 11,0 (a) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria (b) Now assume that the game is made sequential with Row moving first. Illustrate this new game using a game tree and find the rollback equilibrium (c) List the strategies of the two players in this sequential-move game and give the normal-form representation of the game (the payoff matrix) (d) Use the payoff matrix to find the...
2. Consider the following simultaneous move game: Column Left Right 1,1 3,5 11,0 Тoр 7,3 Row Bottom (a) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria (b) Now assume that the game is made sequential with Row moving first. Illustrate this new game using a game tree and find the rollback equilibrium (c) List the strategies of the two players in this sequential-move game and give the normal-form representation of the game (the payoff matrix) (d) Use the payoff matrix to find the...
2. Consider the following simultaneous move game Column Left Right 1.1 7,3 3.5 Тор Row Bottom 11.0 (a) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria. (b) Now assume that the game is made sequential with Row moving first. Illustrate this new game using a game tree and find the rollback equilibrium. (c) List the strategies of the two players in this sequential-move game and give the normal-form representation of the game (the payoff matrix) (d) Use the payoff matrix to find the...
Consider the following simultaneous game: Player 2 L R Player 1 U 30,20 -10-10 D -10-10 20.30 Please indicate whether each of the following statements is true or false. Player 1 has a dominant strategy. This game has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Player 1's payoff in each of the Nash equilibria is 30.
2. (5 points) Use the following payoff matrix for a simultaneous move one shot game to answer the following questions Player 2 Strategy с D E F Player 1 A 6, 14 7, 11 18, 20 10, 19 B 12, 5 15, 7, 25 16, 17 (a) (b) (C) Does player 1 have a dominant strategy? If yes, what is it? If no, why not? Does player 2 have a dominant strategy? If yes, what is it? If no, why...
2. (5 points) Use the following payoff matrix for a simultaneous move one shot game to answer the following questions Player 2 Strategy С D E F Player 1 A 6, 14 7, 11 18, 20 10, 19 B 12, 5 15, 7, 25 16, 17 1 Does player 1 have a dominant strategy? If yes, what is it? If no, why not? Does player 2 have a dominant strategy? If yes, what is it? If no, why not? Does...
Question 5 (25 points). Consider the following simultaneous-move game: Column LIMNIP Ủ11, 1 | 2, 2 | 3, 4 | 9.3 D12, 5 | 3. 311, 217, 1 Row (a) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria. (b) Suppose Row mixes between strategies U and D in the proportions p and (1-p). Graph the payoffs of Column's four strategies as functions of p. What is Column's best response to Row's p-mix? (c) Find the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. What are the players' expected...
1. Assume two players (ie. Florent and Bernard) compete in a one-shot simultaneous move game. Florent can choose up or down, whereas Bernard can choose left, middle or right. Assume the following payoff matrix Bernard Florent Up 6,8 3,2 Down 3.2 4.4 Payoff: (Florent, Bernard) a) Identify the dominant strategy equilibrium(s), if any. (3 marks) b) Identify the Nash equilibrium(s), if any. (3 marks) c) If the players could sign a binding contract as to the actions of each player,...