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Will Up Left Centre Right 2,8 0,9 4,3 3,7 -2,10 2,15 John Down Problem 2 Consider the following simultaneous game given above

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Answer #1

1) Strategy set of john

• SJ = { up, down}

• SW = { left, centre, right}

2) dominant strategy is the Strategy which a player selects always, irrespective of the action choice of other player .

Thus dominant Strategy always provides the highest playoff ,in comparison to all other strategies available, for any action

Choice of all other players

Payoff matrix :

John/ Will left Centre Right
Up (2,8) (0*,9•) (4*,3)
Down (3*,7) (-2,10) (2,15•)

John doesn't have dominant Strategy

Will doesn't have a dominant Strategy

No dominant Strategy eqm exists

3) Nash eqm : it's the set of strategies, so that no player wants to deviate from the chosen strategies

Each player's Strategy is best response to all other players' chosen strategies

NE: ( John plays up, Will plays Centre )

4) yes, dominant Strategy eqm is always A NE

But a NE is not always a dominant Strategy eqm

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