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Suppose that the firms in the Cournot oligopoly decide to collude. The corresponding demand curve for the monopolist is given

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The correct answer is (d) Q* = 24; P* = 52, Profit = 1152.

In order to maximize profit a monopolist produces that quantity at which MR = MC

where MR = Marginal revenue = 100 - 4Q, MC = Marginal Cost = 4

Thus MR = MC

=> 100 - 4Q = 4

=> Q = 24

Hence Profit maximizing Output(Q*) = 24.

Demand is given by : P = 100 - 2Q and as Q = 24 => P = 100 - 2*24 = 52

Hence Profit maximizing Price(P*) = 52.

Profit = TR - TC

where TR = Total Revenue = Price*Quantity = P*Q - Total Cost)i.e. TC)

=> Profit = 52*24 - 4Q = 52*24 - 4*24 = 1152

Hence Maximum profit earned is 1152

Hence, the correct answer is (d) Q* = 24; P* = 52, Profit = 1152.

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