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True or false? - Suppose an industry has one incumbent and three potential new entrants. Any...

True or false? - Suppose an industry has one incumbent and three potential new entrants. Any firm can provide as the incumbent does, with no fixed costs, and marginal cost = bq. Therefore, entry is deterred and blocked. The equilibrium that results is necessarily a cartel.

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