If the incumbent can purchase
new equipment: 1. he can either produce with the old equipment at
marginal cost c =8, or 2 spend K = 5 for new equipment which cust
its marginal cost to c = 6.
Questions:
1. If the incumbent had purchased new equipment and anticipates entry, what quantity does he produce?
2. Will he enter the market?
3. What is the incumbent's payoff?
4. Will the incumbent choose to purchase new equipment in the first place?
Answer question
If the incumbent can purchase new equipment: 1. he can either produce with the old equipment...
Consider an incumbent that is a monopoly currently earning $1 million annually. Given the declining costs of raw materials, the incumbent believes a new firm may enter the market. If successful, a new entrant would reduce the incumbent's profits to $750,000 annually. To keep potential entrants out of the market, the incumbent lowers its price to the point where it is earning $850,000 annually for the indefinite future. If the interest rate is 5 percent, does it make sense for...
Question 1: An incumbent sells steel and faces a potential entrant. Inverse demand curve for steel sales is given by by P = 400-Q, where Q is the total amount sold by both firms. The marginal cost to produce one unit of steel is MC = 100 The entrant incurs fixed costs of F. (a) What are the Cournot prices and quantities in the market, assuming the entrant enters? (b) What are the Stackelberg prices and quantities in the market,...
Suppose two firms compete by selecting quantities q1 and q2, respectively, with the market price given by p = 1000-3q1 -3q2. Firm 1 (the incumbent) is already in the market. Firm 2 (the potential entrant) must decide whether or not to enter and, if she enters, how much to produce. First the incumbent commits to its production level q2. The potential entrant, having seen q1, decides whether to enter the industry. If firm 2 chooses to enter, then it selects...
Can anyone help me with this exercise? It's from David Kreps's A Course in Microeconomic Theory.
Problem 2 gives a standard sort of story on entry deterrence based on an action taken by the incumbent monopolist that makes her There are many stories of this sort; for others, see Tirole (1988). aggressive postentry. тore S industry with an incumbent monopolist, who is currently might not choose to 2. Consider an producing, and a potential entrant, who might or enter There...
1. Consider a market of homogeneous products in which firms compete on quantity. Demand in this market is given by q(p) = 72 - 6p: (1) There are both an incumbent firm M and a potential entrant E which can both produce the good at marginal costs 6. Prior to entry, E must incur an entry cost equal to Ce ≥ 0. (a) Suppose that Ce = 1. What are the equilibrium price, quantity for each firm, and profit for...
1. Consider a market of homogeneous products in which firms compete on quantity. Demand in this market is given by q(p) = 72 - 6p: (1) There are both an incumbent firm M and a potential entrant E which can both produce the good at marginal costs 6. Prior to entry, E must incur an entry cost equal to Ce ≥ 0. (a) Suppose that Ce = 1. What are the equilibrium price, quantity for each firm, and profit for...
4. The demand for product X is PX = 10 − 2X – Y, where Y is the quantity of a substitute product that currently is not being produced. The marginal cost of X is a constatn equal to $1. Entry is completely barred and a monopolist, “Incubment” produces X. Find Incumbent’s price, quantity, and profit. Incumbent wishes to investigate the possibility of introducing Y, which is also protected from entry by other firms. The demand for Y is PY...
Can anyone help me with this exercise? It's from David Kreps's A Course in Microeconomic Theory.
Problem 2 gives a standard sort of story on entry deterrence based on an action taken by the incumbent monopolist that makes her There are many stories of this sort; for others, see Tirole (1988). aggressive postentry. тore S industry with an incumbent monopolist, who is currently might not choose to 2. Consider an producing, and a potential entrant, who might or enter There...
There are two incumbent firms, F1,F2 and also a potential entrant, F3. The steps of the game are: 1. F1 and F2 simultaneously choose outputs q1 ∈ R+ and q2 ∈ R+ respectively. 2. F3 observes q1, q2 and then chooses whether to enter the industry. If she does not, then q3 = 0 and she gets a payoff of zero, but. . . 3. if she has entered the industry, F3 chooses her own output level, q3 ∈ R+....
There are two incumbent firms, F1,F2 and also a potential entrant, F3. The steps of the game are: 1. F1 and F2 simultaneously choose outputs q1 ∈ R+ and q2 ∈ R+ respectively. 2. F3 observes q1, q2 and then chooses whether to enter the industry. If she does not, then q3 = 0 and she gets a payoff of zero, but. . . 3. if she has entered the industry, F3 chooses her own output level, q3 ∈ R+....