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Question 1: An incumbent sells steel and faces a potential entrant. Inverse demand curve for steel sales is given by by P = 4
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Page No Date Salution: Accordling to the Cournot_malel firm 1 LTncumbent) P= 400- ( Ginen) to Now, Total Rewenue = eX px9 (t0firm 2 (Entrant) Total rewenue pxq2 [400-(q1+q 71400 - q1- q2-)92 Now diferentiation ef Tatal Revenue gives Marginal Revenia2q1+92=300 7291 + 100 = 300 21=200 - 100 Now P becomes, 400 - (qi+q22 = 400 - (100 +100) 200 Now p91 - [f+10q] E-X1ρ 1001200-) According to the Stackelbarg madel, fom eg e we have = 300 300 -91 2. FIRM1 x= TR-TC 1009- 400g1-912-9q2-f-10091 300q1- q2Page No. Date : = TV. 176X 150 – E -(100X150) 1250-F -(100x75) 75 x 175 -f 56२5- £ The fts in inuumbent are fa) beiause aftex

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