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Due prior to class discussion 1115/19 consider the P2 following game - A [213 1 8,5...
consider following game the P2 A [213 PI B 166 8.5 4,2 strategies Find the Nash...
consider following game the P2 A [213 PI B 166 8.5 4,2 strategies Find the Nash equilibrium in mixed
Due pcior to clas s discussion 19 Consider the folowing ame A 213 8.5 6,6 Fad the Na sh egulbrinn in mived strrutegies
Due pcior to clas s discussion 19 Consider the folowing ame A 213 8.5 6,6 Fad the Na sh egulbrinn in mived strrutegies
Q.1 Consider the following extensive-form game: Playxo Playr 2 o Player? 8, 6 8,5 7, 6...
Q.1 Consider the following extensive-form game: Playxo Playr 2 o Player? 8, 6 8,5 7, 6 9, 7 Q.1.a Depict the corresponding normal form of the game. Q.1.b Identify the Nash equilibria. Q.1.c Identify the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium by using backward induction.
Please answer 3 Questions, thank you. 4. Consider the following game: PLAYER 2 (0,3) (2,0) (1,7)...
Please answer 3 Questions, thank you.
4. Consider the following game: PLAYER 2 (0,3) (2,0) (1,7) PLAYER 1 (2,4) (0,6) (2,0) (1,3) (2,4) (0,3) a) Does this game have any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium? If so, identify it (or them) and explain why this is an equilibrium. b) Find a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium to this game and explain your calculations. Note: a mixed strategy for player i may be expressed by o; = (P1, P2, 1- P1 - p2). c) Is...
Consider the following extensive form game P1 RP:2 L2 R2 L1 R1 (2,2) (0,3) 1. How many sub-games are there in this game...
Consider the following extensive form game P1 RP:2 L2 R2 L1 R1 (2,2) (0,3) 1. How many sub-games are there in this game? What is the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium? 2. Represent this game as a Normal form game and find all pure strategy Nash Eq. Is there a mixed Nash eq. in this game? If yes, show one. If not, argue why not 3. Now assume that P2 cannot observe P1's action before he makes his move. As such, he...
1 Consider the following normal-form game. P2 L CR P M (a) Does Pl (player 1)...
1 Consider the following normal-form game. P2 L CR P M (a) Does Pl (player 1) have any dominated strategies? (b) Does P2 (player 2) have any dominated strategies? (c) Suppose l2 beleves that Pl is rational, should P2 believe P1 will ever play B? (d) Suppose player P2 rales out the possibility that Pl plays B, is there a dominated ECON 306 Page 2 of 12 2018 strategy for player P2? (e) Can yoa find any more eliminated strategies...
2. consider the following simultaneous move game. Player B LEFT RIGHT Player A UP 4,1 1,4...
2. consider the following simultaneous move game. Player B LEFT RIGHT Player A UP 4,1 1,4 DOWN 2,3 3,2 a. If there is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, what is it and what are the payoffs? b. If there is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, what is it and what are the expected payoffs? 3. Continue with the previous game but suppose this was a sequential game where Player A got to go first. a. Diagram the game...
3. [20] Consider an Edgeworth box economy are given by (a) [5) Find all the Pareto...
3. [20] Consider an Edgeworth box economy are given by (a) [5) Find all the Pareto optimal allocations. sing the normalization, P2 = 1, find the Walrasian equilibrium. ully state the first welfare theorem and verify that it holds. dowments had instead been ē1 = (18,15) and (d) [5] Suppose the en = (2,5). Find the Walrasian equilibrium. 4. [20] Answer the following. (a) [4] Explain the difference between a strategy that is a best response versus a strategy that...
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1 and 2. a). Find the pure-strategy Nash...
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1
and 2.
a). Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. [8
Marks]
b). Find the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the
game. [6 Marks]
c). Derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame.
If players play this mixed Nash equilibrium in the subgame, would 1
player In or Out at the initial mode? [6 Marks]
[Hint: Write down the normal-form of the subgame and derive the
mixed Nash equilibrium of...
Consider the following game. -2,-1 -2,2 8,8 Let a be the probability that P1 plays A...
Consider the following game. -2,-1 -2,2 8,8 Let a be the probability that P1 plays A (and 1-a be the probability they play B). Let 3 be the probability that P2 plays C (and 1- B be the probability that P2 plays D). Solve for the Mixed Strategy Nash equilibria of this game. Input your answer as a number to two decimal places, for example O.XX. What is the equilibrium value of B?
consider following game the P2 A [213 PI B 166 8.5 4,2 strategies Find the Nash equilibrium in mixed
Due pcior to clas s discussion 19 Consider the folowing ame A 213 8.5 6,6 Fad the Na sh egulbrinn in mived strrutegies
Q.1 Consider the following extensive-form game: Playxo Playr 2 o Player? 8, 6 8,5 7, 6 9, 7 Q.1.a Depict the corresponding normal form of the game. Q.1.b Identify the Nash equilibria. Q.1.c Identify the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium by using backward induction.
Please answer 3 Questions, thank you.
4. Consider the following game: PLAYER 2 (0,3) (2,0) (1,7) PLAYER 1 (2,4) (0,6) (2,0) (1,3) (2,4) (0,3) a) Does this game have any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium? If so, identify it (or them) and explain why this is an equilibrium. b) Find a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium to this game and explain your calculations. Note: a mixed strategy for player i may be expressed by o; = (P1, P2, 1- P1 - p2). c) Is...
Consider the following extensive form game P1 RP:2 L2 R2 L1 R1 (2,2) (0,3) 1. How many sub-games are there in this game? What is the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium? 2. Represent this game as a Normal form game and find all pure strategy Nash Eq. Is there a mixed Nash eq. in this game? If yes, show one. If not, argue why not 3. Now assume that P2 cannot observe P1's action before he makes his move. As such, he...
1 Consider the following normal-form game. P2 L CR P M (a) Does Pl (player 1) have any dominated strategies? (b) Does P2 (player 2) have any dominated strategies? (c) Suppose l2 beleves that Pl is rational, should P2 believe P1 will ever play B? (d) Suppose player P2 rales out the possibility that Pl plays B, is there a dominated ECON 306 Page 2 of 12 2018 strategy for player P2? (e) Can yoa find any more eliminated strategies...
3. [20] Consider an Edgeworth box economy are given by (a) [5) Find all the Pareto optimal allocations. sing the normalization, P2 = 1, find the Walrasian equilibrium. ully state the first welfare theorem and verify that it holds. dowments had instead been ē1 = (18,15) and (d) [5] Suppose the en = (2,5). Find the Walrasian equilibrium. 4. [20] Answer the following. (a) [4] Explain the difference between a strategy that is a best response versus a strategy that...
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1
and 2.
a). Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. [8
Marks]
b). Find the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the
game. [6 Marks]
c). Derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame.
If players play this mixed Nash equilibrium in the subgame, would 1
player In or Out at the initial mode? [6 Marks]
[Hint: Write down the normal-form of the subgame and derive the
mixed Nash equilibrium of...
Consider the following game. -2,-1 -2,2 8,8 Let a be the probability that P1 plays A (and 1-a be the probability they play B). Let 3 be the probability that P2 plays C (and 1- B be the probability that P2 plays D). Solve for the Mixed Strategy Nash equilibria of this game. Input your answer as a number to two decimal places, for example O.XX. What is the equilibrium value of B?
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