consider following game the P2 A [213 PI B 166 8.5 4,2 strategies Find the Nash...
Due prior to class discussion 1115/19 consider the P2 following game - A [213 1 8,5 el 6,6 4,2 Find the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies
a) Eliminate strictly dominated strategies.b) If the game does not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium,find the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for the smaller game(after eliminating dominated strategies). Player 2Player 1abcA4,33,22,4B1,35,33,3
Problem #2: Nash Equilibrium with Continuous Strategies (8pts) Consider a game with continuous strategies, in which the two players have the following continuous payoff functions: (S1,2)= (20-4s,)s,-s 2(s1,82) (20-6s)s-s The players choose their strategies from the set s, E (-00, 00). a) Find a best-response function for cach firm. b) Using your answer to part a), solve for the Nash Equilibrium of this game.
a.) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria. b.) *Find all mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. c.) Explain why, in any mixed-strategy equilibrium, each player must be indifferent between the pure strategies that she randomizes over. Consider the following game: - 2 LR 2
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1 and 2. a). Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. [8 Marks] b). Find the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the game. [6 Marks] c). Derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame. If players play this mixed Nash equilibrium in the subgame, would 1 player In or Out at the initial mode? [6 Marks] [Hint: Write down the normal-form of the subgame and derive the mixed Nash equilibrium of...
Exercise 4: For the game "Rock-Paper-Scissors". a. Prove that there is no Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies b. Explain why the only Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies where, in stead of choosing a given strategy, a player can randomize between any number of its available strategies) is to show Rock, Scissors or Paper with probability 1/3 each.
2. consider the following simultaneous move game. Player B LEFT RIGHT Player A UP 4,1 1,4 DOWN 2,3 3,2 a. If there is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, what is it and what are the payoffs? b. If there is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, what is it and what are the expected payoffs? 3. Continue with the previous game but suppose this was a sequential game where Player A got to go first. a. Diagram the game...
Please answer 3 Questions, thank you. 4. Consider the following game: PLAYER 2 (0,3) (2,0) (1,7) PLAYER 1 (2,4) (0,6) (2,0) (1,3) (2,4) (0,3) a) Does this game have any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium? If so, identify it (or them) and explain why this is an equilibrium. b) Find a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium to this game and explain your calculations. Note: a mixed strategy for player i may be expressed by o; = (P1, P2, 1- P1 - p2). c) Is...
Problem 1 Consider the pay-off matrix 1,2 3,1 4,2 2,0 3,5 1,6 1,5 5,4 3,2 (1) Suppose player I guesses that player II will play the mixed strat (2) Find a Nash equilibrium in which player II plays a mixed strat- (3) Is there a Nash equilibrium in which some player has a mixed egy ( , 호, :). What is player l's best response? egy using only the first and third strategies. strategy using all three of his pure...
Consider the following extensive form game P1 RP:2 L2 R2 L1 R1 (2,2) (0,3) 1. How many sub-games are there in this game? What is the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium? 2. Represent this game as a Normal form game and find all pure strategy Nash Eq. Is there a mixed Nash eq. in this game? If yes, show one. If not, argue why not 3. Now assume that P2 cannot observe P1's action before he makes his move. As such, he...