Question

Exercise 4: For the game "Rock-Paper-Scissors". a. Prove that there is no Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies b. Explain why the only Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies where, in stead of choosing a given strategy, a player can randomize between any number of its available strategies) is to show Rock, Scissors or Paper with probability 1/3 each.

Answer 1

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