In the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the following game in which players randomize between B and C and do not play A at all, what is the probability that each plays B?
Let player 1 randomizes between B and C. Player 2 selects B with a probability p and C with a probability 1 - p. Then we have
expected payoff from B = expected payoff from C
1*p + 0*(1 - p) = 0*p + 3*(1 - p)
p = 3 - 3p
4p = 3
p = 3/4
Since the game is symmetric, player 2 will also randomize between B and C with a probability 3/4
Select option D.
In the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the following game in which players randomize between B and...
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