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5. (i) Consider a Cournot quantity setting game of simultaneous moves. Solve for the rationalizable strategies (quantities) f

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(5) mc1=4 mc2 = 2 P = 4o- 91-92 Profit function of firm- I T = TRI- TCI = P.9,- mc,.al T = (40-91-92)9 - 49 - (A) Foc IT = noSolving BR-1 and BR-2 Simultaneously, 9 = 36-92 - 29,= 36-92 From q2 = 38-91 = 29,= 36- (38-21) = 29, = 36-lata! 2 = 29,-0.59T2 = TR2 - TC2 - P. q. - MC₂.92 - (P- MC₂ ) 92 = (15.34 -2) 13.33 - (13.34 ) (13.33) Tz = 177082 Therefore P = 15:34 The = 12Ti = (36-9,-92) 91 136-2 - (33-2) T = (2-24-28res ) (349) IT - 34-291 = 0 - 9 = 34 = 17 therefore 4 - 38-2 - 38-17 = 2! - 10.in game in Sequential game Simultancous Ti = 128.48 T = 144.5 T2 = 110.25 Tz = 177.82 due To marginal cost advantage of firm-if you like the work please appreciate thank you !

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