Question

8. Use the following game matrix for this question Dolores Right D, 3 3,4 4, B Left Center A,21,3 Up Middle 2,0X, Y>4 Down 2,C1,2 The Y>4 is correct for Part A. It may or may not work for Parts B &C a. Solving by elimination of strictly dominated strategies, what values of A, B, C, D, X & Y will lead to a single, Nash in pure strategy of Middle, Center? If not possible explain why. Express your values for A, B, C, D, X & Y as inequalities. If a variable can take any value then say it is greater than zero. What is the minimum payoff, expressed in whole numbers? Solving by elimination of strictly dominated strategies, what values of A, B, C, D, X & Y will lead to a single, Nash in pure strategy of Up, Left? If not possible explain why. Express your values for A, B, C, D, X & Y as inequalities. If a variable can take any value then say it is greater than zero. What is the minimum payoff, expressed in whole numbers? What values of A, B, C, D, X & Y will lead to two Nash in pure strategy with one at Teddy: UP; Dolores: Right and the other at Teddy: Down; Dolores: Left and one Nash in mixed strategy? If not possible explain why. Express your values for A, B, C, D, X & Y as inequalities. If a variable can take any value then say it is greater than zero. What is the minimum payoff, expressed in whole numbers? b. c.

Answer 1

Ans: By using game matrix.

The Y>4 is correct for part A. It may or may not work for part B and C.

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