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Question 15 (1.5 points) The following matrix describes a simultaneous move game between Player 1 and...
2. (5 points) Use the following payoff matrix for a simultaneous move one shot game to answer the following questions Player 2 Strategy с D E F Player 1 A 6, 14 7, 11 18, 20 10, 19 B 12, 5 15, 7, 25 16, 17 (a) (b) (C) Does player 1 have a dominant strategy? If yes, what is it? If no, why not? Does player 2 have a dominant strategy? If yes, what is it? If no, why...
2. (5 points) Use the following payoff matrix for a simultaneous move one shot game to answer the following questions Player 2 Strategy С D E F Player 1 A 6, 14 7, 11 18, 20 10, 19 B 12, 5 15, 7, 25 16, 17 1 Does player 1 have a dominant strategy? If yes, what is it? If no, why not? Does player 2 have a dominant strategy? If yes, what is it? If no, why not? Does...
Use the following payoff matrix for a simultaneous move one shot game to answer the following questions Player 2 Strategy C D E F player 1 A 6, 14 7, 11 18, 20 10, 19 B 12, 5 15, 1 7, 25 16, 17 Does player 1 have a dominant strategy? If yes, what is it? If no, why not? Does player 2 have a dominant strategy? If yes, what is it? If no, why not? Does this game have...
Some Game Theory Problems 3. Find all of the pure strategy Nash Equilibria of the following simultaneous move game. After solving it as a simultaneous move game, write it as a sequential move game with column moving first. Drow the game tree and solve for the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. Column 9,4 1,10 15,7 15,5 14,8 3,10 12,18 20,12 Row C 7,8 6,8 20,10 3,3 15,9 15,0 14,2 9,1 20,18 2,9 10,14 19,20
Question 1 (15 polnts) Consider the following simultaneous-move game Player 2 ILIR T15. 2 | 2,0 B 3,30, 5 A. Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of this game. Player M B. Can player 2 help himself by employing a simple unconditional strategie move? If so, what action will player 2 choose to commit to? What are the players' new payoffs? C. Answer the following question only if your were not able to find an unconditional strategic move. Can player 2...
True or False for each blank
Consider the following simultaneous game: R Player 2 L 30.10 -10,20 Player 1 U 10, 20 D 5,-10 Please indicate whether each of the following statements is true or false. Player 1 has a dominant strategy. This game has a Nash equilibrium. < This game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. V Player 1's best response is D if player 2 plays R. <
In the extensive form representation of the game between Player 1 and Player 2, Player 1 moves first and chooses L or R. If Player 1 chooses R the game ends, if Player 1 chooses L then Player 1 and 2 play a simultaneous move game. The game has______________ pure strategy Nash equilibria and__________ pure strategy Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE). The maximum payoff Player 2 gets in a SPNE is___________ . (Please, enter only numerical answers like: 1, 2,...
4) (20 points) Consider the following two player simultaneous move game which is another version of the Battle of the Sexes game. Bob Opera Alice 4,1 Opera Football Football 0,0 1,4 0,0 Suppose Alice plays a p - mix in which she plays Opera with probability p and Football with probability (1 – p) and Bob plays a q- mix in which he plays Opera with probability q and Football with probability (1 – 9). a) Find the mixed strategy...
2. consider the following simultaneous move game. Player B LEFT RIGHT Player A UP 4,1 1,4 DOWN 2,3 3,2 a. If there is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, what is it and what are the payoffs? b. If there is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, what is it and what are the expected payoffs? 3. Continue with the previous game but suppose this was a sequential game where Player A got to go first. a. Diagram the game...
game theory strategy and dominant strategies
E F 1. (5 points) Can the game theory approach described in chapter 10 be used to analyze the model of Perfect Competition? Please explain. 2. (5 points) Use the following payoff matrix for a simultaneous move one shot game to answer the following questions Player 2 Strategy с D Player 1 A 6, 14 7, 11 18, 20 10, 19 B 12, 5 15, 1 7, 25 16, 17 (a) Does player 1...