3) Consider a community with a very large number of agents. Each agent earns a random...
Pure Exchange Model 1. Consider a Pure Exchange Economy with two agents A and B and two goods X and Y in which each agent acts competitively. Their preferences are given by the following utility function U(X,Y)=X13*Y23 Their initial endowments are as follows W=(5,20) w- (25,10) a) Calculate the demand functions for Good X and Good Y for each agent. b) State the equilibrium conditions for this economy. c) Using these conditions and the demand functions found in part a)...
Charlotte and Wilber are two agents in a two-agent, two-commodity pure exchange economy where apples and bananas are the two commodities. Charlotte loves apples and hates bananas. Her utility function is Ucu, b) = u 5 , where a is the number of apples she consumes and b in the number of bananas she consumes. Wilber likes both apples and bananas. His utility function is Uca, b) = a +2Vb. Charlotte has an initial endowment of no apples and 8...
Suppose that all agents in the economy have the following utility function U(c,l)=( c(1-θ) /(1- θ ))-l where c is consumption, l is the supply of labor, and θ a fixed parameter. Suppose that individuals only have labor income, with an hourly wage of w and a tax rate of t. Thus, the budget constraint of the agent is w(1-t) l=c . We will assume here that θ = 0.5 and w = 1. The elasticity of the labor supply with...
Problem #-Samuelson Public Good Econ 330- YJY 1.. Consider a community consisting of three voters, Al, Bob and Cathy. The Marginal Benefit function for each person is, for lighthouse service G is; MBa = 40 – 4G for Al, MBb = 20 – 2G for Bob, and MBc = 10 – G for Cathy. (Interpret this as demand function.) The marginal cost of producing the government service is MC= 24. (i).. Draw a diagram to show the marginal benefit functions...
1. Consider an agent who values consumption in period 0 and 1 according to the following utility function: u(co, C)In(Co)+8 In(c1) is a discount factor (5 < 1) which indicates that the agnet prefers to consume today more than he can tomorrow. Suppose that the agent is given a total wealth today of w and that he may save any portion of this money in order to consume tomorrow. If he saves money he is paid interest r. Thus the...
thank you Consider an agent who has an original income of 100. The gent now faces an uncertain situation with two states, each state occurring with probability in state 1, the weat faces a safe situation and incurs no cost to his original income. In state 2, the agent suffers an accident that imposes a loss of L=75. Hence in state 1, the agent's income is 100 while in state 2. his income is 100 - 75 = 25. The...
1. Consider an Arrow-Debreu model with 2 periods (1 and 2) and 2 states of the world (1 and 2) in period 2. The home agent has income Y1 = 0, Y2(1) 200, Y2(2) = 50; the probabilities for the different states are π(1) and π(2) = 름 . Th = 100,坋(1) 0,坋(2) = 0; the probabilities for the different states are (1)and *(2) foreign agents have utility function: Ui In(G) +r(1) In(C (1)) + π(2) In(C(2)). Further assume that...
Competitive Equilibrium (10 pts) Consider an economy with a representative consumer, a representative firm, and a government. • The consumer can work up to h hours at an hourly rate of w. She only gets utility from consumption and does not care about how much she works. Their preferences are represented by the utility function U(C, l) = ln(C). The consumer also owns an exogenously given K units of capital, which they can rent to the firms at a price...
Description of the economy: For each of the following problems, consider a 2x2 Exchange Economy with two consumers A and B, and two goods X and Y . The preferences of consumer A can be represented by the utility function uA(xA, yA) = xAyA , where xA is the amount of good A consumed by consumer A, and yA is the amount of good Y consumed by consumer A. The preferences of consumer B can be represented by the utility...
Here are all the information. You don't have to finish all the questions. You can just do the parts you know. 3. Consider a person who chooses an amount of consumption c and non-working or leisure time R to maximize the utility function U(R,c) = 100R – R2 + c subject to the constraint c+wR=wL+M, where L is the maximum amount of time available (i.e., the maximum amount of leisure and labor supply possible) and M is the initial income...