Question

please answer part c

thanks!

2) Imagine a two-player game where individuals in the population are paired at random. There are two possible strategies: heads and tails. If both players play heads or both players play tails, then nobody gets any payoff. However, if a head is paired against a tail, then the head receives 4 units of payoff and the tail receives 6. In other words, we have the following payoff matrix: Heads Tails Heads 10,0 6,4 Tails 4,6 0,0 In fact, neither heads nor tails is an evolutionarily stable strategy 2a) Explain why neither state is stable. 2b) Now imagine that the population is 80% heads and individuals are paired at random. What is the expected payoff of the heads strategy? And what is the expected payoff of the tails strategy? 2c) Assuming that the payoffs represents reproductive fitness, over time, this population will reach a stable state. What is the percentage of heads and tails in this stable state? Show your work and explain how you know this state is stable. ther'e half-

Answer 1

HERE THE GAME IS BEING PLAYED BETWEEN TWO PLAYERS,(EVEN AND ODD). HERE EACH PLAYER HAS A PENNY AND MUCH SECRETLY TURNS THE WHOLE PENNY TO THE HEAD OR TAIL. AFTER THAT THE PLAYER WILL REVEAL THEIR CHOICE SIMULTANIOUSLY.

(A.) PAIRING OF A HEAD AGAINST THE TAILS = 4UNITS TO THE HEAD

PAIRING OF A TAIL  AGAINST THE HEAD= 6 UNITS TO THE TAILS

HERE NEITHER THE HEAD NOR THE TAIL WILL RECEIVE THE STABILITY

BECAUSE HERE WHILE SOLVING MATRIX THE PAYOFF COMES OUT TO BE THE SAME IN BOTH THE CASE (HEAD OR TAIL)

SO THE STABILITY WILL BE = 0 SO NEITHER STATE IS STABLE.