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Question 2

1. (4) Consider the following set of preferences Person 1: A >B>C Person 2: C> A >B Person 3: B>C>A Person 4: A >C>B Person 5

2. (4) Given the above, consider an agenda: A versus C, winner versus B. What is the outcome of this agenda assuming that all

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Answer #1

1.Yes There is a Condorcet winner.

Condorcet winner is one who wins majority of vote in every pairing of head to head election against other candidates.

In this case let's take A,

A vs B,

A wins 3 votes(person 1,2,4) and B wins 2.Therefore A is the winner.

A vs C,

A wins 3 votes against C (person 1,4,5) and C wins 2.Again A is the winner.

Therefore A is the Condorcet winner.

Since A wins in pairwise election against B and C,we can see that B and C will lose in their corresponding elections against A.

No there is no preference cycle because there is a Condorcet winner.

If there was a preference cycle,there wouldn't be a winner and all methods elect same candidate.But this is not the case.We can see that A is the winner against B and C in Condorcet method.

2.In the given case if all people votes sincerely then A would win 3 votes (person 1,4,5) against C with 2 votes in the first process.

In the second step also A would win with 3 votes against B with person 1,2,4 favouring A.

One individual who would gain from not voting sincerely is person 5.Person 5 prefers B against A and C and would prefer B as the winner.

Therefore in the first step,if he favors C against A then the winner of the first step of voting would be C instead of A.In the subsequent step B would be declared winner having person 1,3,5 favouring B thereby making person 5's first choice as winner.

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