(1) Consider the following game: Firm2 0 1 Firmi 0 0,0 0,27 1 27,0 -c, -C...
3. Consider the following two-player game in strategic form LM R A 2,2 2,2 2,2 В 3,3 0,2 0,0 С 0,0 3,2 0,3 This game will demonstrate several methods for ruling out possible mixed- strategy equilibria (a) What are the pure strategy equilibria? (b) Show that there does not exist an equilibrium in which Player 1 (the row player) assigns strictly positive probability to A, to B, and to C. (c) Show that there does not exist an equilibrium in...
(2) Consider the following game: P U M D LR 3,1 0,2 1,2 1,1 0,4 3,1 (a) Show that M is a dominated strategy when mixed strategies are used. (b) Using the observation in part (a) above, find the mixed strategy NE for this game. (3) (Bertrand Model with sequential move) Consider a Bertrand duopoly model with two firms, F and F2 selling two varieties of a product. The demand curve for Fi's product 91 (P1.p2) = 10 - P1...
Consider the following two person static game where Player 1 is the row player and Player 2 is the column player C D A 1, 0,2 2,0 B 0,0 1,3 O a. There is an equilibrium where Player 1 plays A with probability 3/4 O b. There is no mixed strategy Nash equilibrium O c. There is an equilibrium where Player 1 plays A with probability 2/3. O d. There is an equilibrium where Player 1 plays A with probability...
Consider the following function: where x1 2 0,0,A 0, 0<1. a) Suppose that the preferences of a consumer regarding the consumption of goods x1 and x2 are represented by function = f(x1,x2) above. Suppose also that the consumer is endowed with some disposable income Y > 0 and faces prices pı and p2 respectively for goods x1 and x2. i) Derive and describe the demand of the consumer for goods x1 and x2. [20 marks] i) Are demand functions affected...
Q.2 Consider the following normal-form game: Player 2 Player 1 3,2 1,1 -1,3 R. 0,0 Q.2.a Identify the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Q.2.b Identify the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria Q.2.c Calculate each player's expected equilibrium payoff.
Problems 1 Consider an infinite repetition of the game below, and consider the following strategy, to be used by both players. C) Play C initially, or if C was played in the previous period. (II) If there is a deviation from (I), then play P one time and restart (), (III) If there is a deviation from (II), then restart (II) For what values of δ will players play C forever i C D P C 4,40,6 0,0 D 6,0...
onsider the following two person static game where Player 1 is the row player and Player 2 is the column player C D E A 1,1 0,2 2,0 B 0,0 1,-1 -1,3 a. There is an equilibrium where Player 1 plays A with probability 3/4. b. There is an equilibrium where Player 1 plays A with probability 2/3. c. There is an equilibrium where Player 1 plays A with probability 1/2. d. There is no mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Problem 1: Consider the following simultaneous move game with two players, denoted by 1 and 2: 1 2 T B L 1,0 0,2 M R 0,1 5,0 2,1 1,0 1. Is there a strategy for any of the players which a player would never choose? 2. If there is a strategy which a player never chooses (it is called, a dominated strategy), and this fact is known among the players, find the equilibria of the game. Hint: In a mixed...
#1. (30 points) Consider the following normal-form game. (a) (10 points) Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria. (b) (20 points) Find all mixed strategy Nash equilibria. EFG | A 0,0 3, 4, 1 B5,5 0,01,-1 C 2.0 1,0 2,6 D 1,0 1,4 6,3
4. Consider the following game matrix: LCR T 3 ,1 0,0 4,1 M10, 02, 24, 3 B 7,6 | 1,2 3,1 (a) Find all the strictly dominated (pure) strategies for each player. (b) Find all the weakly dominated (pure) strategies of each player. (c) Does the game has a strict dominant strategy equilibrium?