Individuals in the market consist of two types A and B. The individual demands for each type are and . (Note: they look similar to the ones in the earlier questions, but these are individual demands and those were market demands). The firm's cost function is C(x)=6x. A consultant proposes a two-part tariff. Consumers have to pay a fixed fee F and a per-unit fee of 6. The fixed fee is equal to the consumer surplus the lower demand type would have had if it just paid the per-unit fee. What is the firm's profit under this pricing scheme assuming there is one 1 consumer of each type. Enter a number only.
Ans:
Demand for type A:
x = 24 - p
Inverse demand: p = 24 - x
Demand for type B:
x = 24 - 2p
p = 12 - 0.5x
Optimal conditions:
Less willing consumer = B.
Reason: Maximum willingness to pay is 12 only.
MC = dC / dx = 6.
Price = 6.
Efficient quantity for type B consumer:
P = MC
12 - 0.5x = 6
x = 12.
Fixed fee (F) = Consumer surplus of B
= 0.5(12 - 6)(12) = 36.
Firm's profit: Profit from A + Profit from B
= 2 X F + (P - MC)xa + (P - MC)xb = 2 X 36 + 0 + 0= 72.
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