Homework Answers
Suppose, A is the player with valuation is a. Then, if there are bids more than or equal to a, his best response is to bid a as otherwise he may win the bith by paying more than a.
If everyone bids less than a, then he will bid a and win the object with the second last bid price. No strategy can give a better result.
Thus, bidding your own value must be a weakly dominant strategy.
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Explain why it is a weakly dominant strategy to bid your value in a sealed bid...
Explain why a player in a sealed-bid, second-price auction would never submit a bid thatexceeds his...
Explain why a player in a sealed-bid, second-price auction would never submit a bid thatexceeds his or her true value of the object being sold. (Hint: What if all players submittedbids greater than their valuations of the object?)
Second Price sealed bid-auction: Assume n players are bidding in an auction in order to obtain an...
Second Price sealed bid-auction: Assume n players are bidding in an auction in order to obtain an indivisible object. Denote by vi the value player i attaches to the object; if she obtains the object at the price p her payoff is vi −p. Assume that the players’ valuations of the object are all different and all positive; number the players 1 through n in such a way that v1 > v2 > · · · > vn > 0....
Explain why it is a weakly dominant strategy for you to show up for both of...
Explain why it is a weakly dominant strategy for you to show up for both of your midterms, even if you have not studied at all. [Remember, I drop your worst midterm and replace it with the grade you receive on your final, provided this helps you.]
Consider a second-price sealed-bid auction as the one analyzed in class. Suppose bidders' valuations are v1-10...
Consider a second-price sealed-bid auction as the one analyzed in class. Suppose bidders' valuations are v1-10 and v2=10. Select all that apply. a. Bidding a value b1 equal to her own valuation vy is a weakly dominated strategy for bidder D. Both bidders submitting bids equal to 10 is a Nash equilibrium. C. One bidder submitting a bid equal to 10 and the other submitting a bid equal to 0 is a Nash equilibrium. d. Both bidders submitting bids equal...
Question 1: Explain why it is a weakly dominant strategy for you to show up for both of your midterms, even if you have...
Question 1: Explain why it is a weakly dominant strategy for you to show up for both of your midterms, even if you have not studied at all. [Remember, I drop your worst midterm and replace it with the grade you receive on your final, provided this helps you.]
Three (3) bidders participate in a first price, sealed bid auction satisfying all the assumptions of...
Three (3) bidders participate in a first price, sealed bid auction satisfying all the assumptions of the independent private values model. Each knows his own value v ∈ [0, 1], but does not know anyone else's, and so must form beliefs. Suppose everyone thinks it is more likely a rival's value is high than low. Specifically, each player believes any other player's value is distributed on [0, 1] according to the cumulative distribution function F(v) = v3, and this is...
You are a bidder in an independent private auction, and you value the object at $2000. Each bidder assumes that the valuations are uniformly distributed between $1000 and $5000. Determine your optimal...
You are a bidder in an independent private auction, and you value the object at $2000. Each bidder assumes that the valuations are uniformly distributed between $1000 and $5000. Determine your optimal bidding strategy in a first-price sealed bid auction when the total number of bidders are: 2, 10, and 100.
You are a bidder in an independent private auction, and you value the object at $2000....
You are a bidder in an independent private auction, and you value the object at $2000. Each bidder assumes that the valuations are uniformly distributed between $1000 and $5000. Determine your optimal bidding strategy in a first-price sealed bid auction when the total number of bidders are: 2, 10, and 100.
Suppose you are a bidder in a first-price sealed-bid auction for a single object, where players...
Suppose you are a bidder in a first-price sealed-bid auction for a single object, where players submit bids simultaneously and the player who bid the highest wins the object and must pay his/her bid. Assume there are two other bidders, so this is a three-player game. You do not observe the valuations of the other bidders, but assume that you believe their valuations are identically and independently distributed according to a uniform distribution on the interval from 0 to 20....
After a first-price, sealed bid common values auction, John, another bidder, laughs at you becaus...
After a first-price, sealed bid common values auction, John, another bidder, laughs at you because you won the auction by bidding $100,000 and the average value of all the bids is only $70,000. The standard of deviation of the bids is $10,000. a. How is this the winner’s curse? Explain b. John claims that he is 100% certain you will find out soon that you overbid and the actual value will be less than $100,000. Can John be wrong? Explain.
Consider a second-price sealed-bid auction as the one analyzed in class. Suppose bidders' valuations are v1-10 and v2=10. Select all that apply. a. Bidding a value b1 equal to her own valuation vy is a weakly dominated strategy for bidder D. Both bidders submitting bids equal to 10 is a Nash equilibrium. C. One bidder submitting a bid equal to 10 and the other submitting a bid equal to 0 is a Nash equilibrium. d. Both bidders submitting bids equal...
Question 1: Explain why it is a weakly dominant strategy for you to show up for both of your midterms, even if you have not studied at all. [Remember, I drop your worst midterm and replace it with the grade you receive on your final, provided this helps you.]
Suppose you are a bidder in a first-price sealed-bid auction for a single object, where players submit bids simultaneously and the player who bid the highest wins the object and must pay his/her bid. Assume there are two other bidders, so this is a three-player game. You do not observe the valuations of the other bidders, but assume that you believe their valuations are identically and independently distributed according to a uniform distribution on the interval from 0 to 20....
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