If neither enters, both make 0.
Hence at (N,N) the payoff should be (0,0).
The first N is for Firm 1, second for Firm 2.
If both enter, both earn a loss of 5.
At (E,E) the payoff should be (-5,-5).
If only one enters, entrant gets 10.
So when Firm 1 enters and Firm 2 doesn't, the payoff for (E,N) is (10,0).
When Firm 2 enters and Firm 1 doesn't, the payoff for (N,E) is (0,10).
The correct option is therefore, the first option.
QUESTION 15 Consider the following simultaneous-move game: Two firms, Firm 1 (raw player) and Firm 2...
8. Consider a sequential entry game between an incumbent firm (Firm 1) and a potential entrant (Firm 2). Firm 1 moves first and must choose whether to lobby the government to pass a new safety regulation or lobby the government to reject a new safety regulation. Firm 1 is sufficiently powerful that it gets its way with the regulators. Firm 2 moves second and must choose whether to enter this market and compete with Firm 1 or stay out of...
Derek (Player 1) and Susan (Player 2) are playing the following simultaneous move stage game in an infinitely-repeated game. Susan Cooperate Defect Derek Cooperate 4, 4 0, 9 Defect 9, 0 3, 3 What is the minimum discount rate needed for Derek and Susan to sustain cooperation in this infinitely repeated game? Please solve for the minimum δ required, and enter your answer as a number to two decimal places. For instance, you would enter 1/3 as “0.33”.
Consider the finite 2 player game, representing price competition in a market where al costumers buy from the seller with the lowest price. Both sellers simultaneously choose price, p1 and p2, where pi is in P = {0,1,2,3,4}. The profits to each seller are given in the payoff bi-matrix below, where seller 1 chooses row and seller 2 column. Firm 2 p=0 p=1 p=2 p=3 p=4 p=0 -5,-5 -10,0 -10,0 -10,0 -10,0 p=1 0,-10 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 p=2 0,-10...
Consider the following game: there are two players, an incumbent (denoted I) and a potential entrant (denoted E) to the market. The entrant has two actions: it can either enter the market in which the incumbent operates, or not enter. The incumbent has two actions: it can either fight the entrant, or accommodate. The payoffs are as follows: if E enters and I fights, E gets -1 and I gets 2. If E does not enter, I gets 10 for...
Question 15 (1.5 points) The following matrix describes a simultaneous move game between Player 1 and Player 2. Player 2 - Player 1 9,1 15,5 10, 20 14, 25 Select the Nash equilibriums from the following list. Player 1 plays M, Player 2 plays L Player 1 plays M, Player 2 plays R Player 1 plays B, Player 2 plays L Player 1 plays B, Player 2 plays R
Question 1 (15 polnts) Consider the following simultaneous-move game Player 2 ILIR T15. 2 | 2,0 B 3,30, 5 A. Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of this game. Player M B. Can player 2 help himself by employing a simple unconditional strategie move? If so, what action will player 2 choose to commit to? What are the players' new payoffs? C. Answer the following question only if your were not able to find an unconditional strategic move. Can player 2...
Consider the following information for a simultaneous move game: Firm Advertise Don't Advertise Advertise 90, 90 500, 50 Firm A Don't Advertise 50, 500 150, 250 If the two firms plan to be in business for 20 years, then the Nash equilibrium is for Each firm to advertise in early years, but not advertise in later years. Both firms to advertise in every year. Neither firm to advertise in early years but to advertise in later years. Both firms to...
4) (20 points) Consider the following two player simultaneous move game which is another version of the Battle of the Sexes game. Bob Opera Alice 4,1 Opera Football Football 0,0 1,4 0,0 Suppose Alice plays a p - mix in which she plays Opera with probability p and Football with probability (1 – p) and Bob plays a q- mix in which he plays Opera with probability q and Football with probability (1 – 9). a) Find the mixed strategy...
Problem VI: Consider the following dynamic game: An entrant chooses whether to enter the market or stay out. If he chooses to stay out he will get $0, while the incumbent gets $20. If he enters the market, the entrant and the incumbent play the following simultaneous pricing game: they both choose whether to price high or low. If they both price low, they each get $5. If they both price high, they each get $10. If one prices low...
Consider two firms 1 and 2 engaging into the following one-shot game: if firm 1 advertises and firm 2 does not, firm 1 will make $20 million in profits and firm 2 will make $6 million. If firm 2 advertises and firm 1 does not, firm 1 will make $2 million and firm 2 will make $6 million. If firm 1 advertises and firm 2 advertises, each firm earns $10 million. If neither firm advertises, firm 2 will make $8...