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Firm A and Firm B compete in the sale of a product with market inverse demand given by P(Q) = 260-Q, where Q is market output

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15) p=260-q1-q2

MR1=260-2q1-q2

MC1=20

MR1=MC2{ Profit Maximizing condition}

260-2q1-q2=20

Q1=120-0.5q2{ best response function of firm1}

By symmetry we can derive best response function of firm 2,

Q2=120-0.5q1{ best response function of firm 2}

Putting q2 into q1,

Q1=120-0.5(120-0.5q1)=120-60+0.25q1

Q1=60/0.75=80

Q2=120-0.5*80=80

Q=q1+q2=80+90=160

16)p=260-Q=260-160=100

They will sell their output at 100 $ per unit.

17) The profit Maximizing quantity depends on variable cost,so Increase ij fixed cost doesn't change the profit Maximizing quantity.,

So option C is right

18) Because firm 2 MC is same ,so its best response function will be same as before

MR1=260-2q1-q2

MC1=10

260-2q1-q2=10

Q1=125-0.5q2{ best response function of firm 1}

Putting q2 into q1

Q1=125-0.5(120-0.5q1}=125-60+0.25q1

Q1=65/0.75=86.67

Q2=120-0.5*86.67=76.67

OPTION C is right

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