Firm A and Firm B compete in the sale of a product with market inverse demand...
Firm A and Firm B compete in the sale of a product with market inverse demand given by P(Q) = 260-Q, where Q is market output, and Q = 9A + 9B (9A = Firm A's output, 9B = Firm B's output). Firm A's Total Cost function is given by TCA9A) = 209A and Firm B's is given by TCB(9B) = 209B. 15. (20 points) Find the value of Q when Firms A and B Cournot compete to maximize profits...
Suppose that Firm A's total cost function were to change to TCA(qq) = 109a + 50, (so, a fixed cost of 50 has been added). Which of the following statements would then be TRUE? This will decrease Firm A's equilibrium level of output b. a. This will increase Firm B's equilibrium level of output This will not affect either firm's equilibrium level of output d. c. This will increase the price at which output is sold in this market Suppose...
Find the value of Q when Firms A and B Cournot compete to maximize profits (i.e. when they simultaneously determine profit maximizing output). Firm A and Firm B compete in the sale of a product with market inverse demand given by P(0) = 260-Q, where Q is market output, and Q = 9A + 96 (9A = Firm A's output, 93 = Firm B's output). Firm A's Total Cost function is given by TCA9A) = 209A and Firm B's is...
17.) Suppose that Firm A’s total cost function were to change to TCa(qa)= 10qa+ 50, (so, a fixed cost of 50 has been added). Which of the following statements would then be TRUE? a.This will decrease Firm A’s equilibrium level of output. b.This will increase Firm B’s equilibrium level of output. c.This will not affect either firm’s equilibrium level of output. d.This will increase the price at which output is sold in this market. 18.) Suppose that Firm A’s total...
17.) Suppose that Firm A’s total cost function were to change to TCa(qa)= 10qa+ 50, (so, a fixed cost of 50 has been added). Which of the following statements would then be TRUE? a.This will decrease Firm A’s equilibrium level of output. b.This will increase Firm B’s equilibrium level of output. c.This will not affect either firm’s equilibrium level of output. d.This will increase the price at which output is sold in this market. 18.) Suppose that Firm A’s total...
[12] Two firms, A and B. operate in a market as Cournot competitors. Each has the following reaction functions A's reaction function B's reaction function - QA = 200 - 20 Qs = 400 - 20 where QA and Q. denote the production levels of A and B, respectively. Accordingly, we would expect firm A to produce _ and firm B to produce_, which coincides with the Cournot Equilibrium. 80,60 60,280 200.0: None of the above [12] Two firms, A...
Consider two firms (Firm A and Firm B) competing in this market. They simultaneously decide on the price of the product in a typical Bertrand fashion while producing an identical product. Both firms face the same cost function: C(qA) = 12qA and C(qB) = 12qB, where qA is the output of Firm A and qB is the output of Firm B. The demand curve is P = 30 - Q. (i) What will be the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium price (pB) chosen...
Assume that two companies (A and B) are duopolists who produce identical products. Demand for the products is given by the following linear demand function: P=200−QA−QBP=200−QA−QB where QAQA and QBQB are the quantities sold by the respective firms and P is the selling price. Total cost functions for the two companies are TCA=1,500+55QA+QA2TCA=1,500+55QA+QA2 TCB=1,200+20QB+2QB2TCB=1,200+20QB+2QB2 Assume that the firms form a cartel to act as a monopolist and maximize total industry profits (sum of Firm A and Firm B profits). In...
In Little Town, there are two suppliers of mineral water: A and B. Mineral water is considered a homogenous good. Let pA and pB denote the price and qA and qB the quantity sold by firms A and B, respectively. Suppose that the municipality provides all the water for free, so firms don't bear any production cost. The inverse demand function for mineral water is given by P=12-1/3Q where Q=qA + qB denotes the aggregate supply of mineral water. Suppose...
Two identical firms compete as a Cournot duopoly. The inverse market demand they face is P = 120-2Q. The total cost function for each firm is TC1(Q) = 4Q1. The total cost function for firm 2 is TC2(Q) = 2Q2. What is the output of each firm? Find: Q1 = ? Q2 = ?