Homework Answers
There is only one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this case
Note that the choices circled with red represents best responses of player 1 for every strategy select by player 2. Similarly, the choices circled with green represents best responses of player 2 for every strategy select by player 1. There is only set of choices selected by both: (TT, R) which represents the only Nash equilibrium.
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Exercise 2. Compute every pure strategy Nash equilibria in the following game. LCR TT 2,3 8,2...
4. Find all of the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium to the following simultaneous move game. Column...
4. Find all of the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium to the following simultaneous move game. Column 15, 8 3,8 9,10 10,6 2 7,4 6,5 3,3 5,0 Row 35,3 3,6 2,7 11,5 47,2 2,3 6,1 10,0 9,0 5 6,4 2,2 12,3
Please find all the pure strategy Nash Equilibria of the following game? thank you IR 2,3...
Please find all the pure strategy Nash Equilibria of
the following game? thank you
IR 2,3 1,3 5,1 2,3 2,4 6,0 1,2 0,5 1,5 M B
18.7 Homework • Unanswered How many Nash equilibria are there in the game below? Person 2...
18.7 Homework • Unanswered How many Nash equilibria are there in the game below? Person 2 Low Med High 3,0 4,1 5,2 2,2 3,4 4,5 1,6 2,5 3,4 Low Med. High Person 1 ] |
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1 and 2. a). Find the pure-strategy Nash...
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1
and 2.
a). Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. [8
Marks]
b). Find the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the
game. [6 Marks]
c). Derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame.
If players play this mixed Nash equilibrium in the subgame, would 1
player In or Out at the initial mode? [6 Marks]
[Hint: Write down the normal-form of the subgame and derive the
mixed Nash equilibrium of...
a.) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria. b.) *Find all mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. c.) Explain why, in...
a.) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
b.) *Find all mixed-strategy Nash equilibria.
c.) Explain why, in any mixed-strategy equilibrium, each player
must be indifferent between the pure strategies that she randomizes
over.
Consider the following game: - 2 LR 2
Find all pure strategy Nash Equilibria in the following games a.) Player 2 b1 b2...
Find all pure strategy Nash Equilibria in the following games a.) Player 2 b1 b2 b3 a1 1,3 2,2 1,2 a2 2,3 2,3 2,1 a3 1,1 1,2 3,2 a4 1,2 3,1 2,3 Player 1 b.) Player 2 A B C D A 1,3 3,1 0,2 1,1 B 1,2 1,2 2,3 1,1 C 3,2 2,1 1,3 0,3 D 2,0 3,0 1,1 2,2 Player 1 c.) Player 2 S B S 3,2 1,1 B 0,0 2,3
Consider the following game: a) Identify all Nash Equilibria (Pure Strategy and Mixed) of this simultaneous...
Consider the following game:
a) Identify all Nash
Equilibria (Pure Strategy and Mixed) of this simultaneous game.
b) Identify a trigger strategy for
each player that sustains (B,B) as an equilibrium in an infinitely
repeated game. For what interest(discount) rates will this outcome
be sustainable?
Firm 2 А B A -5,-5 195,-50 Firm 1 -50,215 45,75
(b) Compute the pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria and test for the intuitive criterion in the...
(b) Compute the pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria and test for the intuitive criterion in the signaling game in Fig. 5.8. 1,2 0,1 tu O: 18) .5 2, 0 3,0 Chance 0,0 1,0 it R II-3 3,1 .2.2 Just find the perfect Nash equlibriam
6. Consider the following game: a. Identify all Nash Equilibria (Pure Strategy and Mixed) of this...
6. Consider the following game: a. Identify all Nash Equilibria (Pure Strategy and Mixed) of this simultaneous game. b. Draw the two extensive form games that arise from each firm moving first. What are the Subgame Perfect Equilibria of these games? c. Identify a trigger strategy for each player that sustains (B,B) as an equilibrium. For what interest (discount) rates will this outcome be sustainable?
#2. Find all pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria (if any) in the following game. U...
#2. Find all pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria (if any) in the following game. U 1,1 0,0 0, -1 S 0,0 1,1 0, -1 D.0.0 0,-1
4. Find all of the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium to the following simultaneous move game. Column 15, 8 3,8 9,10 10,6 2 7,4 6,5 3,3 5,0 Row 35,3 3,6 2,7 11,5 47,2 2,3 6,1 10,0 9,0 5 6,4 2,2 12,3
Please find all the pure strategy Nash Equilibria of
the following game? thank you
IR 2,3 1,3 5,1 2,3 2,4 6,0 1,2 0,5 1,5 M B
18.7 Homework • Unanswered How many Nash equilibria are there in the game below? Person 2 Low Med High 3,0 4,1 5,2 2,2 3,4 4,5 1,6 2,5 3,4 Low Med. High Person 1 ] |
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1
and 2.
a). Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. [8
Marks]
b). Find the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the
game. [6 Marks]
c). Derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame.
If players play this mixed Nash equilibrium in the subgame, would 1
player In or Out at the initial mode? [6 Marks]
[Hint: Write down the normal-form of the subgame and derive the
mixed Nash equilibrium of...
a.) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
b.) *Find all mixed-strategy Nash equilibria.
c.) Explain why, in any mixed-strategy equilibrium, each player
must be indifferent between the pure strategies that she randomizes
over.
Consider the following game: - 2 LR 2
Consider the following game:
a) Identify all Nash
Equilibria (Pure Strategy and Mixed) of this simultaneous game.
b) Identify a trigger strategy for
each player that sustains (B,B) as an equilibrium in an infinitely
repeated game. For what interest(discount) rates will this outcome
be sustainable?
Firm 2 А B A -5,-5 195,-50 Firm 1 -50,215 45,75
(b) Compute the pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria and test for the intuitive criterion in the signaling game in Fig. 5.8. 1,2 0,1 tu O: 18) .5 2, 0 3,0 Chance 0,0 1,0 it R II-3 3,1 .2.2 Just find the perfect Nash equlibriam
#2. Find all pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria (if any) in the following game. U 1,1 0,0 0, -1 S 0,0 1,1 0, -1 D.0.0 0,-1
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Amplitude=3;
fs=8000;
n=0:399;
t=0:1/fs: n*1/fs-1/fs;
signal=3+3*cos(2*pi*1100*t)+3*cos(2*pi*2200*t)+3*cos(2*pi*3300*t);
fftSignal= fft(signal);
fftSignal=f ftshift (fftSignal);
f=fs/2*linspace(-1,1,fs);
plot(f,abs(fftsignal);
xlabel('Frequency(Hz)’)
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