Please find all the pure strategy Nash Equilibria of the following game? thank you IR 2,3...

Question

Question

IR 2,3 1,3 5,1 2,3 2,4 6,0 1,2 0,5 1,5 M B

Please find all the pure strategy Nash Equilibria of the following game? thank you

Answer 1

Answer #1

M is weakly dominant strategy of Row player. Hence, the Row player will only M game. ( 2, 4, 6) >= ( 2, 1 , 5)

Likewise, C is weakly dominant strategy of Column player.

Each player will go with only weakly dominant strategy. it is the best strategy or equally good.

Nashe Equilibrium: ( M, C) or ( 2,4)

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Answer 2

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