Question

Passage A

Not only are there cases in which torture is morally permissible, but sometimes it may be morally required. Suppose the police had someone in custody whom you suspected of having information that could help stop a plan to unleash a weapon of mass destruction upon a metropolitan area. Nothing should be prohibited in the attempt to get the needed information—not even torture. After all, we expect the police to do whatever is within their power to save an innocent victim. Imagine a similar example in which a police officer has to shoot and kill someone who is holding a child hostage at gunpoint and promising to kill the child. No one would fault the officer for killing the hostage-taker in order to save the life of the child. If killing is acceptable in such cases, then surely mere torture (where, after all, the informant gets to keep his or her life) should be acceptable in the case suggested.

Which of the following, if any, function as primary analogues in Passage A? Check all that apply.

Police doing whatever is in their power to save an innocent victim

The shooting of a hostage-taker

The torturing of an informant

The use of violence to save innocent lives

Which of the following, if any, function as secondary analogues in Passage A? Check all that apply.

The shooting of a hostage-taker

Police doing whatever is in their power to save an innocent victim

The torturing of an informant

The use of violence to save innocent lives

Which statement best expresses the conclusion put forward by the argument in Passage A?

Torture is never immoral.

There are cases in which torture is morally permissible and, possibly, morally required.

If you can save innocent lives without killing, then you are morally required to do so.

Torture is better than death.

Which statement best poses a disanalogy to the argument that has been given?

The case of the hostage-taker and the case of the informant are not the same. In one case, only one person's life is at stake. In the other case, there may be thousands of lives at stake.

The case of the hostage-taker and the case of the informant are not the same because the hostage-taker has a gun, but the informant does not.

The case of the hostage-taker and the case of the informant are not the same. When you kill the hostage-taker, you know the child will be taken from harm's way. But information gained through torture has been shown to be often unreliable.

Which of the following best suggests a counteranalogy to address the disanalogy suggested in the preceding question?

Even if the torture isn't guaranteed to stop the attack, we should do everything we can to save an innocent life. You wouldn't tell someone to refrain from performing CPR on someone just because there's no guarantee that he or she will be able to revive the victim.

You want the police to do whatever they can to save innocent lives, because you never know who might need saving. Maybe next time it will be your child who is taken hostage.

Even if the result of an action or activity is morally acceptable, that doesn't make the action itself acceptable. I may agree that it is good to save innocent lives without agreeing that the torture itself is good. The end does not always justify the means.

Answer 1

1. The correct answer is Option C. The torturing of an informant functions as the primary analogue.

2. The correct answer is Option B. The shooting of a hostage taker serves as the secondary analogue.

3. The correct answer is Option B. There are cases in which torture is morally permissible and, possibly, morally required.

4. The correct answer is Option C. The case of the hostage-taker and the case of the informant are not the same. When you kill the hostage-taker, you know the child will be taken from harm's way. But information gained through torture has been shown to be often unreliable.

5. The correct answer is Option A. Even if the torture isn't guaranteed to stop the attack, we should do everything we can to save an innocent life. You wouldn't tell someone to refrain from performing CPR on someone just because there's no guarantee that he or she will be able to revive the victim.