4. Consider two firms with the following cost functions: c(x) = 4x +1 and c(x) =...
3. A monopolist sells two products x and y for which the demand functions are P. 84-4x, P. = 127-3y, and the combined total cost function is TC = 2x² + 3xy +4 y2 +64. a. Find the profit function. b. Find the profit-maximizing level of output for each product. c. Find the profit-maximizing price for each product. d. Find the maximum profit.
Consider a perfectly competitive market comprised of identical firms each facing the following cost function: C(q) = 4 +q? where q is the firm-specific level of production of the representative firm. The market demand function is Q(p) = 400 - 4p where Q(p) is the aggregate demand in the market (expressed as function of price) and p is the price a) Derive the firm-specific supply function of the representative firm as a function of price b) Assume there are N...
5. Cournot Competition Consider a Coumot duopoly model. Suppose that market demand is P-a-qi Also suppose that the cost functions of the two firms are TG (q) = q, and T( (a) Write the profit function, and the first order condition. (b) Find out the profit maximizing output for each firm. (c) Find the pofit earned by each firm, total profit eamed by the two fims to (d) Now assume that the two firms collude and act as a monopoly....
Consider two firms facing the demand curve P=90-SQ. 17 where Q Q1+02. The firms' cost functions are С, (A) 10 +sal 13 12 and C2(92)#5+10Q2. Suppose that both firms have entered the industry. What is the joint profit-maximizing level of output? How much will each firm produce? Combined, the firms will produceunits of output, of which Firm 1 will produce units and Firm 2 will produce units. (Enter a numeric response using a real number rounded to two decimal placos.)...
Please answer the following question fully and in detail! Consider a Bertrand duopoly with two firms 1,2 who sell the same good. The demand curve of the good is given by Q = 30 − p if p < 30 and Q = 0 if p ≥ 20. Both firms have the same constant unit cost 5. Firms 1,2 set prices p1, p2. If firms set different prices, then the firm which sets the minimum price of the two, receives...
Exercise 3.3: Nonlinear equations 1. Find the zeros of the following functions graphically: b) g\left(x\right)=2x^2-4x-16 4 c) For the following function determine if x = 1 is a root: 5. Find the rational roots, if any, of the following: b) 8x^3+6x^2-3x-1=0 6. Find the equilibrium solution for each of the following models: a) Q_d=Q_s Q_d=3-P^2 Q_s=6P-4
PROBLEM #1 Consider a market with two firms that sell products that are identical. Su market demand is as follows: P-56-Q , where Q measures the total output produced by both firms (that is, Q=q +q.) and qi and q, are the quantities produced by firm 1 and firm 2, respectively. The per-unit cost of production is $6 for each firm, and so the firm's cost functions are 6q, and 6q, respectively. Each firm seeks to maximize profits. The firms...
1. Consider the following asymmetric version of the Cournot duopoly model. Two firms compete by simultaneously choosing the quantities (q, and q2) they produce. Their products are homogeneous, and market demand is given by p- 260-2Q, where Q-q +q2. Firm 1 has a cost advantage; Firm 1 produces at zero cost, while Firm 2 produces at a constant average cost of 40. (The difference in costs is what makes this an asymmetric game.) a. Derive both firms' profit functions, as...
1.Consider an industry with only two firms that produce identical products. Each of the firms only incurs a fixed cost of $1000 to produce and marginal cost is 20. The market demand function is as follows: Q=q1+q2=400-P a. Assuming that the firms form a cartel, calculate the profit-maximizing quantity of output, price and profits b. If the firms choose to behave as in the Cournot model, what would be the profit- maximizing quantities of output, price and profits? c. if...
Please answer the following question fully and in detail! Consider a Bertrand duopoly with two firms 1,2 who sell the same good. The demand curve of the good is given by Q = 15 − p if p < 15 and Q = 0 if p ≥ 15. Both firms have the same constant unit cost 2. Firms 1,2 set prices p1, p2. If firms set different prices, then the firm which sets the minimum price of the two, receives...