Question

A group of 7 players play the following game. Each writes down a positive integer that...

A group of 7 players play the following game. Each writes down

a positive integer that is less than 1000. The player who writes down the

smallest number is awarded a prize equal to the number of dollars equal to

the number that she wrote down. If there is a tie for smallest number, the

prize is divided equally among those who wrote the smallest number. Find

the strategy or strategies that survive iterated deletion of strictly dominated

strategies. Explain your answer.

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Answer #1

play Nut Smallesb ane On sima So, all valus 2 x 4 1000 is het il ne ale ам

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