a. Firm A profits= $1000
Firms B profits= $1000
reason- when firms collude their Profit will be maximum.
b. Firm A profit=$1250
Firm B profit= $300
reason- When one firm A cheats it will lower the price and firm B will keep high prices.
c. Firm A Profit=$700
Firm A strategy= Low price
Firm B strategy= Low price
Firm B Profit= $700
reason- When both firms act independently there Dominant strategy is to keep price low.
So profit for both firms is $700.
d. Firm B strategy= Low price
Firm B profit= 1250
Reason- when Firm A always keeps High price it is more beneficial for firm B to keep low prices.
If it helps kindly upvote
HdPre LI A-100 A-1250 High Price B-1000 R Firm B A-300 A700. Lower B-1250 B-700 a....
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