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1-4 Player 2 2 Question 4: (15pt total] Consider the following game: X Y Player 1 p A1, 32, 4 1-p B 0,28,0 Suppose Player 1 p

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2 1-q 1 4 P A (2,4) B 0,2) (8,0) I-P 1 1 player plays a with probability p, and player 2 plays x with probability a i) E, CA)mi) Ex) 3. P+ 2 C1-p) = 3p+2-2p Prz iv) E₂(4) = 4P+ 0.1 - 4p. 9 ) b ) Indifterence strategy for player is E,CA) = ECB) 2-9 =4) Inditterence strategy for player 2 Ez(x) = 624) pt2 = 40 3p=2 P=2² di Mixed Hash equilibrium is, 649,243) (2/3,64) ) Thus

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