Ans is C
Any Firm will cheat only when it is beneficial for the firm to Cheat. When Firm 2 cheats then it is beneficial for firm 2 and firm 2 profit increases but simultaneously firm 1 profit decreases. And increase in Firm 2 profit is lower than the reduction in firm 1 profit
There are only two firms in an industry with demand curves q1 = 30 - P...
1.Consider an industry with only two firms that produce identical products. Each of the firms only incurs a fixed cost of $1000 to produce and marginal cost is 20. The market demand function is as follows: Q=q1+q2=400-P a. Assuming that the firms form a cartel, calculate the profit-maximizing quantity of output, price and profits b. If the firms choose to behave as in the Cournot model, what would be the profit- maximizing quantities of output, price and profits? c. if...
Suppose that the only two firms in an industry face the market (inverse) demand curve p=160-q.Each has constant marginal cost equal to 16 and no fixed costs. Initially the two firms compete as Cournot rivals (Chapter 11) and each produces an output of 48.Why might these firms want to merge to form a monopoly? What reason would antitrust authorities have for opposing the merger? (Hint:Calculate price, profits, and total surplus before and after the merger.)Suppose that each firm has fixed...
ECON M?C There are two firms in an industry. The industry demand curve is given by p = 60 - q. Each firm has one manufacturing plant and each firm i has a cost function C(q) = 97, where qi is the output of firm i. The two firms form a cartel and arrange to split total industry profits equally. Under this cartel arrangement, they will maximize joint profits if Select one: O a. each firm produces 15 units in...
Suppose that the only two firms in an industry face the market (inverse) demand curve p- 130-Q. Each has constant marginal cost equal to 4 and no fixed costs. Initially the two firms compete as Cournot rivals (Chapter 11) and each produces an output of 42. Why might these firms want to merge to form a monopoly? What reason would antitrust authorities have for opposing the merger? (Hint: Calculate price, profits, and total surplus before and after the merger.) The...
consider two (2) profit- maximizing firms that behave as quantity setters and supply a homogenous product. market demand is P=20-Q. Total cost of each firm are C(q1) =1/2q1^2 a) calculate the equilibrium quantities and profit of each firm b) now suppose that two firms play a repeated game and decides to form a cartel. they make a cartel agreement that their joint profits , and involve each of them setting the same quantity in each period .calculate the cartel quantity...
Consider two firms facing the demand curve P=90-SQ. 17 where Q Q1+02. The firms' cost functions are С, (A) 10 +sal 13 12 and C2(92)#5+10Q2. Suppose that both firms have entered the industry. What is the joint profit-maximizing level of output? How much will each firm produce? Combined, the firms will produceunits of output, of which Firm 1 will produce units and Firm 2 will produce units. (Enter a numeric response using a real number rounded to two decimal placos.)...
Two firms compete as a duopoly. The demand they face is P = 100 - 3Q. The cost function for each firm is C(Q) = 4Q. Determine output, and profits for each firm in a Cournot oligopoly If firms collude, determine output and profit for each firm. If firm 1 cheats on the collusion in item 2, determine output and profit for each firm. Graph the reaction functions and identify the points from parts 1, 2 and 3. Determine output,...
An industry consists of two firms with identical demand function ? = 100 − ??, where ?? = ?1 + ?2. Both firms have identical cost ?? = 40??, where ? = 1,2. Both firms pay attention to the behaviour of their competitor in determining the output produced, and both firms make their decision simultaneously (no one moves first). (a) If both firms decide to compete in determining their outputs, find the profit maximizing q and P and calculate the...
The answers I filled are wrong. 1 Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms in the market. Their costs are given by C1 = 60Q1 and C2 = 60Q2, where Q1 is the output of Firm 1 and Q2 is the output of Firm 2. Price is determined by the following demand curve: P= 900-Q where Q = Q1 +Q2: Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Calculate the profit of each firm at this equilibrium....
Joint profit maximizing level of output Consider two firms facing the demand curve 17 P#90-SQ. where Q Q1+Q2. The firms' cost functions are C1 (91) -10+50, and c2(Q2)#5+10Q2. Suppose that both firms have entered the industry. What is the joint profit-maximizing level of output? How much will each firm produce? Combined, the firms will produce units of output, of which Firm 1 will produce ] units and Firm 2 will produce □ units. (Enter a numeric response using a real...