Suppose that the only two firms in an industry face the market (inverse) demand curve p-...
Suppose that the only two firms in an industry face the market (inverse) demand curve p=160-q.Each has constant marginal cost equal to 16 and no fixed costs. Initially the two firms compete as Cournot rivals (Chapter 11) and each produces an output of 48.Why might these firms want to merge to form a monopoly? What reason would antitrust authorities have for opposing the merger? (Hint:Calculate price, profits, and total surplus before and after the merger.)Suppose that each firm has fixed...
EC202-5-FY 10 9Answer both parts of this question. (a) Firm A and Firm B produce a homogenous good and are Cournot duopolists. The firms face an inverse market demand curve given by P 10-Q. where P is the market price and Q is the market quantity demanded. The marginal and average cost of each firm is 4 i. 10 marks] Show that if the firms compete as Cournot duopolists that the total in- dustry output is 4 and that if...
4. In a market for dry cleaning, the inverse market demand function is given by P=160-10 and the (private) marginal cost of production for the aggregation of all dry dleaning firms is given by MC- 10+1Q. Finally, the pollution generated by the dry cleaning process creates external damages given by the marginal external cost curve MEC 1Q Calculate the output and price of dry cleaning if it is produced under competitive cond tions without regulation. The competitive equilbrium quanity is...
Suppose there are two firms, 1 and 2, competing in quantity. The market demand is p = 15-(q1 +q2), where q1 and q2 are the quantities produced by rms 1 and 2. Both rms have constant marginal cost c1 = c2 = 3. (a) [10] Find the Cournot equilibrium of this market. Compute the consumer surplus in equilibrium. b) Now suppose firms 1 and 2 merge, so that they become a monopolist with demand function p = 15 ? q,...
You are asked to perform a merger simulation. Suppose inverse demand is P=360-Q. a) There are three firms in the industry: A, B and C. The firms have costs of zero. Suppose the three firms pick quantities simultaneously. That is, they play a Cournot game. What quantities do the firms choose? What is the price? Hint: In this case, Q=QA+QB+Qc. Compute MR for each of the three firms, and then derive three best response functions, and then solve the three...
Suppose two firms compete in Cournot competition. The market inverse demand curve is ? = 200 − ?1 − ?2. Firm 1 and firm 2 face the same marginal cost curve, ?? = 20. Therefore, profit for firm 1 is ?1 = (200 − ?1 − ?2)?2 − 20?1 and similarly for firm 2. a. Solve for the Cournot price, quantity, and profits. b. Suppose firm 1 is thinking about investing in technology that can reduce its costs to $15...
Joint profit maximizing output and Cournot model Consider two firms facing the demand curve P=75-5C, where Q Q1 +Q2. The firms' cost functions are Cl (Q1) = 15 +10Q1 and C2 (Q2)-10 + 20Q2. Suppose that both firms have entered the industry. What is the joint profit-maximizing level of output? How much will each firm produce? Combined, the firms will produce units of output, of which Firm 1 will produce units and Firm 2 will produceunits. (Enter a numeric response...
Consider a homogeneous-product Cournot oligopoly with four firms. Suppose that the inverse demand function is P(Q) = 64 – Q. Suppose that firms incur a constant marginal cost c = 4. Characterize the equilibrium of the game in which all firms simultaneously choose quantity. Suppose that firms 1 and 2 consider merging and that there are synergies leading to marginal costs cm < c. Characterize the new market equilibrium. At what level of cm are the two firms indifferent whether...
[Cournot competition with N firms] There are three identical firms in the industry. The inverse demand function is p(Q-1-Q, where Q = q1 +92+93 denotes aggregate output. To facilitate your calculations, assume that the marginal cost for all firms is zero, c 0· 2. (a) Find the best response function for each firm. Interpret b) Compute the Cournot equilibrium. (c) Assume that two of the three firms merge (transforming the industry into a duopoly). Show that the profit of the...
Can someone help with the problem below? Suppose two oligopolistic firms face a market (inverse) demand curve P(Y + Y2) = 20 - (Y1 + Y). Both firms produce at constant marginal cost, but they are not symmetric: firm 1 has marginal cost 2 and firm 2 has marginal cost 4. For each of the following competitive situations below, compute: • The equilibrium price. • The equilibrium quantities produced by each firm. • The profits received by each firm. (a)...