Please see the above picture attached .With three firms ,Quantity produced by each firm=90 and price charged=90
But with mergers ,only two firms ,Quantity charged by each firm=120 and price charged=120.
DOJ is concerned with price increses, which is 33.33% and thus oppose the merger.
You are asked to perform a merger simulation. Suppose inverse demand is P=360-Q. a) There are...
Consider an (inverse) demand curve P = 30 - Q. And a total cost curve of C(Q) = 12Q. (a) Assume a monopolist is operating in this market. (i) Calculate the quantity (qM) chosen by a profit-maximizing monopolist. (ii) At the profit-maximizing quantity, what is the monopolistic market price (pM) of the product. (iii) Calculate the dead-weight loss (allocative inefficiency) associated with this monopoly market. Assume the market for this product is perfectly competitive. (i) Calculate the market-clearing output (qPC)...
Consider a homogeneous-product Cournot oligopoly with four firms. Suppose that the inverse demand function is P(Q) = 64 – Q. Suppose that firms incur a constant marginal cost c = 4. Characterize the equilibrium of the game in which all firms simultaneously choose quantity. Suppose that firms 1 and 2 consider merging and that there are synergies leading to marginal costs cm < c. Characterize the new market equilibrium. At what level of cm are the two firms indifferent whether...
Suppose that the only two firms in an industry face the market (inverse) demand curve p- 130-Q. Each has constant marginal cost equal to 4 and no fixed costs. Initially the two firms compete as Cournot rivals (Chapter 11) and each produces an output of 42. Why might these firms want to merge to form a monopoly? What reason would antitrust authorities have for opposing the merger? (Hint: Calculate price, profits, and total surplus before and after the merger.) The...
Consider an (inverse) demand curve P = 30 - Q. And a total cost curve of C(Q) = 12Q. Two firms (Firm A and Firm B) competing in this market. They simultaneously decide on the price of the product in a typical Bertrand fashion while producing an identical product. Both firms face the same cost function: C(qA) = 12qA and C(qB) = 12qB, where qA is the output of Firm A and qB is the output of Firm B. (i)...
1. Consider a three firm (n = 3) Cournot oligopoly. The market inverse demand function is p (Q) = 24 Q. Firm 1 has constant average and marginal costs of $12 per unit, while firms 2 and 3 have constant average and marginal costs of $15 per unit. a)Verify that the following are Nash equilibrium quantities for this market: q1 = 9 / 2 and q2 = q3 = 3 / 2 . b)How much profit does each firm earn...
Suppose that the only two firms in an industry face the market (inverse) demand curve p=160-q.Each has constant marginal cost equal to 16 and no fixed costs. Initially the two firms compete as Cournot rivals (Chapter 11) and each produces an output of 48.Why might these firms want to merge to form a monopoly? What reason would antitrust authorities have for opposing the merger? (Hint:Calculate price, profits, and total surplus before and after the merger.)Suppose that each firm has fixed...
. A Cournot duopoly with homogeneous products has an inverse demand curve P-400- 5(OA+QB) and costs are CA(QA) 30QA and Ce(Qa)- 40QB. a. Determine the reaction function for each firm. b. Calculate each firm's equilibrium output and the market's equilibrium price. c. Calculate the profit each firm carns in equilibrium.
EC202-5-FY 10 9Answer both parts of this question. (a) Firm A and Firm B produce a homogenous good and are Cournot duopolists. The firms face an inverse market demand curve given by P 10-Q. where P is the market price and Q is the market quantity demanded. The marginal and average cost of each firm is 4 i. 10 marks] Show that if the firms compete as Cournot duopolists that the total in- dustry output is 4 and that if...
Part 1 Consider a market with a demand curve given (in inverse form) by P(Q) = 80 – 0.25Q, where Q is total market output and P is the price of the good. Two firms compete in this market by simultaneously choosing quantities q1 and q2 (where q1 + q2 = Q). This is an example of Choose one: A. Stackelberg competition. B. Cournot competition. C. Bertrand competition. D. perfect competition.Part 2 Now suppose the cost of production is constant at $50.00 per unit (and is the same...
[Cournot competition with N firms] There are three identical firms in the industry. The inverse demand function is p(Q-1-Q, where Q = q1 +92+93 denotes aggregate output. To facilitate your calculations, assume that the marginal cost for all firms is zero, c 0· 2. (a) Find the best response function for each firm. Interpret b) Compute the Cournot equilibrium. (c) Assume that two of the three firms merge (transforming the industry into a duopoly). Show that the profit of the...