Question

Consider a first price auction for selling one item. There are n bidders. Each bidder i...

Consider a first price auction for selling one item. There are n bidders. Each bidder i has a valuation vi for the item, which is privately known and drawn independently from a uniform distribution of interval [0,50]. Each bidder i bids a non-negative real number bi. The bidder who bids the highest number wins and if more than one bidder bid the highest, the winner is chosen uniformly at random. The winner gets the item and pays her bid. All other bidders pay 0.

(a) Assume that every bidder except i uses a linear strategy, i.e., bi(vi) =a+cvi, where the constants a and c are the same for all bidders. Find the expected payoff of bidder i when she bids bi. (Hint: For simplicity of calculations, assume that bidder i wins only when all the other bids are less than bi.)

(b) Find a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for this auction.

(c) Under your equilibrium in part b, what is the expected revenue for the seller when n= 10? What happens to the expected revenue as n→∞?

0 0
Add a comment Improve this question Transcribed image text
Answer #1

Answer a) :

We give two guides to outline games in vital structure. 1 . The first game is the game of Prisoner’s Dilemma. Suppose N = {1, 2}. These players are prisoners. Because of lack of evidence, they have been questioned in separate rooms and made to confess their crimes. If they both confess, then they each achieve a payoff of 1. If both of them do not confess, then they can achieve higher payoffs of 2 each. However, if one of them confesses, but the other one does not confess, then the confessed player gets a payoff of 3 but the player who does not confess gets a payoff of 0. What are the strategies in this game? For both the players, the arrangement of techniques is {Confess (C), Do not admit (D)}. The payoffs from the four strategy profiles can be written in a matrix form. It is shown in Table 1. 2. Now, consider an example of an auction. There are two bidders in an auction. Every bidder reports an offer in the closeout. The most noteworthy bidder wins and pays a sum equivalent to his offer - if there should be an occurrence of ties, both win the article with equivalent likelihood. The result of the bidder from winning.

C (1, 1) (3, 0) D (0, 3) (2, 2) Table 1: The Prisoner's Dilemma is his worth less his offer - if there should be an occurrence of ties, 1 2 times this worth. The result of the bidder from losing is zero. The methodology of every player in this game in any non-negative genuine number. On the off chance that technique bi is utilized by player I ∈ {1, 2}, at that point fi(bi , b−i) be the likelihood of winning for bidder I - this is 1 if bi > b−i and zero if bi < b−i and 1 2 in any case. The utility of the bidder I is simply (vi −bi)fi(bi , b−i) at a system profile (bi , b−i). Notice that the arrangement of procedures for every bidder is the arrangement of all non-negative genuine numbers for this situation - a boundless set.

Answer b) :

A  Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the “expanded game” in which each player 's space of pure strategies is the set of maps from Θi to i . The ideas underlying these theorems and proofs are identical to those for the existence of equilibria in (complete information) strategic form games.Abstract: Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is not a subset of Nash equilibrium.

Flawless Bayesian harmony expects players to have convictions that are reliable with the balance systems of different players. Nash equilibrium does not explicitly specify the beliefs of the players.Finding the Nash equilibrium for any game involves two stages. It does not identify mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. An unadulterated system balance is the place every player plays one explicit technique. A blended methodology balance is the place in any event one player in the game randomizes over a few or the entirety of their unadulterated methodologies.

Answer c :

Expected revenue n =10/2 =5

Income is the pay created from typical business tasks and incorporates limits and conclusions for brought stock back. It is the top line or gross pay figure from which expenses are deducted to decide overall gain. Deals Revenue recipe. Income is otherwise called deals on the salary articulation.

For a business, salary alludes to net benefit for example , what remains after expenses and taxes are subtracted from revenue. Income is the aggregate sum of cash the business gets from its clients for its items and administrations. At the point when salary is spoken to as a level of income, it's called net revenue.

________________________________________________________________

please please up vote this answer. Your up vote is so valuable to me. Please. Thank you so much.

Add a comment
Know the answer?
Add Answer to:
Consider a first price auction for selling one item. There are n bidders. Each bidder i...
Your Answer:

Post as a guest

Your Name:

What's your source?

Earn Coins

Coins can be redeemed for fabulous gifts.

Not the answer you're looking for? Ask your own homework help question. Our experts will answer your question WITHIN MINUTES for Free.
Similar Homework Help Questions
  • Consider a single-item auction with n bidders where n ≥ 3. The highest bidder wins the...

    Consider a single-item auction with n bidders where n ≥ 3. The highest bidder wins the auction and pays the amount of the third highest bid. Show that this auction is not dominant strategy incentive compatible

  • Four bidders participate in first price auction for a single object that is of the following...

    Four bidders participate in first price auction for a single object that is of the following value to them: V1 = 150,          V2 = 100,          V3 = 90,            V4 = 80 The information above is known to all (i.e., each bidder knows not only his own valuation but also that of the other bidders). If two bidders or more bidders place the same bid, one of them is selected at random to be the winner. Select all that apply a. There's a Nash...

  • Four bidders participate in first price auction for a single object that is of the following...

    Four bidders participate in first price auction for a single object that is of the following value to them: V1 = 150,          V2 = 100,          V3 = 90,            V4 = 80 The information above is known to all (i.e., each bidder knows not only his own valuation but also that of the other bidders). If two bidders or more bidders place the same bid, one of them is selected at random to be the winner. Select all that apply a. There's a Nash...

  • Game Theory Eco 405 Homework 2 Due February 20, 2020 1. Find all the Nash equilibria...

    Game Theory Eco 405 Homework 2 Due February 20, 2020 1. Find all the Nash equilibria you can of the following game. LCDR T 0,1 4,2 1,1 3,1 M 3,3 0,6 1,2 -1,1 B 2.5 1.7 3.8 0.0 2. This question refers to a second-price, simultaneous bid auction with n > 1 bidders. Assume that the bidders' valuations are 1, ,... where > > ... > >0. Bidders simultaneously submit bids, and the winner is the one who has the...

  • Second Price sealed bid-auction: Assume n players are bidding in an auction in order to obtain an...

    Second Price sealed bid-auction: Assume n players are bidding in an auction in order to obtain an indivisible object. Denote by vi the value player i attaches to the object; if she obtains the object at the price p her payoff is vi −p. Assume that the players’ valuations of the object are all different and all positive; number the players 1 through n in such a way that v1 > v2 > · · · > vn > 0....

  • Consider a second-price sealed-bid auction as the one analyzed in class. Suppose bidders' valuations are v1-10...

    Consider a second-price sealed-bid auction as the one analyzed in class. Suppose bidders' valuations are v1-10 and v2=10. Select all that apply. a. Bidding a value b1 equal to her own valuation vy is a weakly dominated strategy for bidder D. Both bidders submitting bids equal to 10 is a Nash equilibrium. C. One bidder submitting a bid equal to 10 and the other submitting a bid equal to 0 is a Nash equilibrium. d. Both bidders submitting bids equal...

  • Four bldders particlpate in first price auction for a single object that is of the following...

    Four bldders particlpate in first price auction for a single object that is of the following value to them: The information above is known to all (e., each bldder knows not only his own valuation but also that of the other bidders). If two bldders or more bidders place the same bid, one of them is selected at random to be the winner. Select all that apply l . There's a Nash Equilibrium wherc the bids are: b1 150, b2...

  • Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction as the one analyzed in class. Suppose bidders' valuations are v1-10...

    Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction as the one analyzed in class. Suppose bidders' valuations are v1-10 and v2=10. Suppose bidder 2 submits a bid b2 10. Then, in a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies bidder 1 must be submitting a bid equal to equilibrium, bidder 1's payoff is equal to beuas bnlendninand In this Nash (please, enter numerical values only, for example: 4).

  • Suppose you are a bidder in a first-price sealed-bid auction for a single object, where players...

    Suppose you are a bidder in a first-price sealed-bid auction for a single object, where players submit bids simultaneously and the player who bid the highest wins the object and must pay his/her bid. Assume there are two other bidders, so this is a three-player game. You do not observe the valuations of the other bidders, but assume that you believe their valuations are identically and independently distributed according to a uniform distribution on the interval from 0 to 20....

  • 2. Second Price Auction& Google Search Auction (18 points) A. (11 points) There are two bidders,...

    2. Second Price Auction& Google Search Auction (18 points) A. (11 points) There are two bidders, bidder 1 and bidder 2, bidding for one object. Their valuations of the object (vi, v2) are simultaneously submit their bidding prices (b, by The one with the higher price wins the auction and pays the loser's price, the second highest price. (In answering the questions below, no detailed explanations are needed and you just need to directly give the conclusion.) independent. Each one...

ADVERTISEMENT
Free Homework Help App
Download From Google Play
Scan Your Homework
to Get Instant Free Answers
Need Online Homework Help?
Ask a Question
Get Answers For Free
Most questions answered within 3 hours.
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT