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Four bldders particlpate in first price auction for a single object that is of the following value to them: The information above is known to all (e., each bldder knows not only his own valuation but also that of the other bidders). If two bldders or more bidders place the same bid, one of them is selected at random to be the winner. Select all that apply l . Theres a Nash Equilibrium wherc the bids are: b1 150, b2 100, b3-go, b4 Пь. There is a NE in which player 1 wins the object 80, I Iheres a Nagh Equlibrium where the bids are: bi s, b2 9, b3 0, b-B d. Theres a Nash Eqlibriurn where the bids are b 103, b2-102, b3 84 b4-74 e. Theres a Nash Equlibriurn where each bidder offers half of his value of the object.

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fous bldders pastcipale in irst price the tolloci g value to A ns c〉 There is Nash equilibrium-in dhen. hich rtajes sin the osjeci d〉,Th ere is a Nash equlbium where the bids ase bi:gg. , b238 Eaplaincution s ince the birst agent has the highest alue, ere oi be a Nash equilibum mere aaentaets the object, and b〉 S NE because towin the objecti agen L mus+ be Pay a女 Can aet ey

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