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Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost c(Q)={Q. a....
1. Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(q)...
1. Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(q) =*Q2. a. What is the inverse demand? b. What is the competitive equilibrium market quantity and price? C. If the market had a monopoly, what is the equilibrium quantity and price? Set up the profit maximization and show all steps. d. What is the mark up? e. What is the monopoly's profit? f. What is the deadweight loss compared to perfect competition?
1. Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(Q)=Q2....
1. Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(Q)=Q2. a. What is the inverse demand? b. What is the competitive equilibrium market quantity and price? c. If the market had a monopoly, what is the equilibrium quantity and price? Set up the profit maximization and show all steps. d. What is the mark up? e. What is the monopoly's profit? f. What is the deadweight loss compared to perfect competition?
Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(Q) 9)...
Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(Q) 9) = 3Q?. (10 points) Suppose the two firms cannot collude and instead compete in the Cournot Model in the market described in question 1 (market demand is still Q 18 – P) with the same cost (C(q) = -23. 2 a. Set up firm 1's profit maximization. b. Solve for firm 1's best response function. C. Solve for firm 1's quantity, firm 2's quantity,...
Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(Q) 9)...
Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(Q) 9) = 3Q?. Suppose that that firm 2 that invests in a new technology that changes it cost structure from firm 1. Market demand is still Q = 18 – P, firm 1 still faces costs 1 f(0) == Q}, and now firm 2 has costs, C3(Qx) = 23. Consider a Cournot model again. a. What is firm 1's best response function? b. Set up...
Suppose we have two firms with the same cost C(q) = {Q2 in a market which...
Suppose we have two firms with the same cost C(q) = {Q2 in a market which demand is Q 18 – P, the two firms compete in the Cournot Model. a. Set up firm 1's profit maximization and best response function. b. Solve for firm 1's quantity, firm 2's quantity, the equilibrium market quantity, and price. Please show your work. c. Is this a Nash equilibrium?
Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(Q) 9)...
Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(Q) 9) = 3Q?. Suppose a second firm enters the market described in question 1 (market demand is 1 still Q = 18 – P) with the same cost (cle) = 109. a. If the two firms successful collude what is the equilibrium market quantity and price? b. If the two firms successfully collude what is the joint profit? C. What do we call a collusion...
Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(Q) 9)...
Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(Q) 9) = 3Q?. Suppose that firm 1 in the market described in question 1 has first mover advantage. (Market demand is Q 18 – P and both firms have the same cost C(Q) - Q? a. What do we call a market where two firms move sequentially? b. Set up and solve for firm l's output, firm 2's output, market output, and equilibrium price. Show...
Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(Q) 9)...
Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(Q) 9) = 3Q?. 1 Suppose we realize that the market described in question 1 (Market demand is still Q = 18 – P) has a negative externality. The cost function Cp(Q) -Q2 is private cost. We 2 now know the cost of the externality is CE(Q) = Q2. a. What is the marginal cost of the externality, MCE? b. What is the marginal cost to...
Suppose we have a market with two firms, and market demand Q = 18 - P...
Suppose we have a market with two firms, and market demand Q = 18 - P and a cost c(Q) =Q2. Suppose that firm 1 has first mover advantage. a. What do we call a market where two firms move sequentially? b. Set up and solve for firm 1's output, firm 2's output, market output, and equilibrium price. Show all work for each step. C. Do consumers prefer this over the Cournot equilibrium? d. Does firm 2 prefer this type...
Suppose we have a market with a negative externality. Market demand is Q = 18 -...
Suppose we have a market with a negative externality. Market demand is Q = 18 - P The private cost is Cp(Q) = Q and the cost of the externality is CzQ) = Q?. a. What is the marginal cost of the externality, MCg? b. What is the marginal cost to society of production MCs? c. What is the Socially Optimal quantity and price? d. Suppose the government wanted to tax a monopoly in this market with a negative externality....
1. Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(q) =*Q2. a. What is the inverse demand? b. What is the competitive equilibrium market quantity and price? C. If the market had a monopoly, what is the equilibrium quantity and price? Set up the profit maximization and show all steps. d. What is the mark up? e. What is the monopoly's profit? f. What is the deadweight loss compared to perfect competition?
1. Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(Q)=Q2. a. What is the inverse demand? b. What is the competitive equilibrium market quantity and price? c. If the market had a monopoly, what is the equilibrium quantity and price? Set up the profit maximization and show all steps. d. What is the mark up? e. What is the monopoly's profit? f. What is the deadweight loss compared to perfect competition?
Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(Q) 9) = 3Q?. (10 points) Suppose the two firms cannot collude and instead compete in the Cournot Model in the market described in question 1 (market demand is still Q 18 – P) with the same cost (C(q) = -23. 2 a. Set up firm 1's profit maximization. b. Solve for firm 1's best response function. C. Solve for firm 1's quantity, firm 2's quantity,...
Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(Q) 9) = 3Q?. Suppose that that firm 2 that invests in a new technology that changes it cost structure from firm 1. Market demand is still Q = 18 – P, firm 1 still faces costs 1 f(0) == Q}, and now firm 2 has costs, C3(Qx) = 23. Consider a Cournot model again. a. What is firm 1's best response function? b. Set up...
Suppose we have two firms with the same cost C(q) = {Q2 in a market which demand is Q 18 – P, the two firms compete in the Cournot Model. a. Set up firm 1's profit maximization and best response function. b. Solve for firm 1's quantity, firm 2's quantity, the equilibrium market quantity, and price. Please show your work. c. Is this a Nash equilibrium?
Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(Q) 9) = 3Q?. Suppose a second firm enters the market described in question 1 (market demand is 1 still Q = 18 – P) with the same cost (cle) = 109. a. If the two firms successful collude what is the equilibrium market quantity and price? b. If the two firms successfully collude what is the joint profit? C. What do we call a collusion...
Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(Q) 9) = 3Q?. Suppose that firm 1 in the market described in question 1 has first mover advantage. (Market demand is Q 18 – P and both firms have the same cost C(Q) - Q? a. What do we call a market where two firms move sequentially? b. Set up and solve for firm l's output, firm 2's output, market output, and equilibrium price. Show...
Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(Q) 9) = 3Q?. 1 Suppose we realize that the market described in question 1 (Market demand is still Q = 18 – P) has a negative externality. The cost function Cp(Q) -Q2 is private cost. We 2 now know the cost of the externality is CE(Q) = Q2. a. What is the marginal cost of the externality, MCE? b. What is the marginal cost to...
Suppose we have a market with two firms, and market demand Q = 18 - P and a cost c(Q) =Q2. Suppose that firm 1 has first mover advantage. a. What do we call a market where two firms move sequentially? b. Set up and solve for firm 1's output, firm 2's output, market output, and equilibrium price. Show all work for each step. C. Do consumers prefer this over the Cournot equilibrium? d. Does firm 2 prefer this type...
Suppose we have a market with a negative externality. Market demand is Q = 18 - P The private cost is Cp(Q) = Q and the cost of the externality is CzQ) = Q?. a. What is the marginal cost of the externality, MCg? b. What is the marginal cost to society of production MCs? c. What is the Socially Optimal quantity and price? d. Suppose the government wanted to tax a monopoly in this market with a negative externality....
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