Cournot Model
P = 18 – Q
P = 18 – (Q1 + Q2)
Cost function of Firm 1: C1 = 0.5Q21
Cost function of Firm 2: C2 = 0.5Q21
The profits of the duopolists are
Π1 = PQ1 – C1 = [18 – (Q1 + Q2)]Q1 – 0.5Q21
Π1 = 18Q1 – Q21 – Q1Q2 – 0.5Q21
Π1 = 18Q1 – 1.5Q21 – Q1Q2
Π2 = PQ2 – C2 = [18 – (Q1 + Q2)]Q2 – 0.5Q22
Π2 = 18Q2 – Q22 – Q1Q2 – 0.5Q22
Π2 = 18Q2 – 1.5Q22 – Q1Q2
For profit maximization under the Cournot assumption we have
∂Π1/∂Q1 = 0 = 18 – 3Q1 – Q2
∂Π2/∂Q2 = 0 = 18 – 3Q2 – Q1
The reaction functions are
Q1 = 6 – (1/3)Q2
Q2 = 6 – (1/3)Q1
Replacing Q2 into the Q1 reaction function we get
Q1 = 6 – 1/3[6 – (1/3)Q1]
Q1 = 4.5
And
Q2 = 6 – (1/3)Q1
Q2 = 6 – (1/3)(4.5)
Q2 = 4.5
Thus, the total output in the market is
Q = Q1 + Q2 = 4.5 + 4.5 = 9
And the market price
P = 18 – Q
P = 18 – 9
P = 9
Collusive Model
We have the following information
Demand equation: P = 18 – (Q1 + Q2)
Assuming Q = Q1 + Q2
Total Cost (TC) equation for Firm 1: C1 = 0.5Q21
Total Cost (TC) equation for Firm 2: C2 = 0.5Q22
The main aim of the central agency running the cartel is to maximize the total profit of the cartel
ΠT = Π1 + Π2
Where
Π1 = TR1 – TC1 and Π2 = TR2 – TC2
TR = Total Revenue
TC = Total Cost
Thus
ΠT = (TR1 + TR2) – TC1 – TC2
ΠT = P(Q1 + Q2) – 0.5Q21 – 0.5Q22
ΠT = (18 – Q1 – Q2)(Q1 + Q2) – 0.5Q21 – 0.5Q22
ΠT = 18Q1 – Q12 – Q1Q2 + 18Q2 – Q1Q2 – Q22 – 0.5Q21 – 0.5Q22
ΠT = 18Q1 + 18Q2 – 2QAQB – 1.5QB2 – 1.5QA2
Setting the partial derivatives equal to zero we obtain
∂Π1/∂Q1 = 18 – 3Q1 – 2Q2 = 0
∂Π2/∂Q2 = 18 – 3Q2 – 2Q1 = 0
Q1 = 6 – (2/3)Q2
Q2 = 6 – (2/3)Q1
Solving for Q1 and Q2 we obtain
Q1 = 3.6
Q2 = 3.6
Total Output: Q = Q1 + Q2
Q = 3.6 + 3.6 = 7.2
P = 18 – Q
P = 18 – 7.2
P = 10.8
So, we can see that in Collusive model the price is higher and output is lower as compared to the Cournot model. So, we can say that while consumers will prefer Cournot model, the two firms will prefer Collusive model.
Suppose the two firms cannot collude and instead compete in the Cournot Model in the market described in question 1 (market demand is still Q=18-P) with the same cost (C(Q)=1/2 *Q^2). Set up firm 1’s profit maximization. Solve for firm 1’s best response function. Solve for firm 1’s quantity, firm 2’s quantity, the equilibrium market quantity, and price. Show your work. Is this a Nash equilibrium? Do consumers prefer the Cournot competition equilibrium over the collusion of the two firms...
3. Suppose the two firms cannot collude and instead compete in the Cournot Model in the market described in question 1 (market demand is still Q = 18 – P) with the same cost (C(Q)=Q2). a. Set up firm 1's profit maximization. b. Solve for firm 1's best response function. C. Solve for firm 1's quantity, firm 2's quantity, the equilibrium market quantity, and price. Show your work. d. Is this a Nash equilibrium? e. Do consumers prefer the Cournot...
Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(Q) 9) = 3Q?. Suppose that firm 1 in the market described in question 1 has first mover advantage. (Market demand is Q 18 – P and both firms have the same cost C(Q) - Q? a. What do we call a market where two firms move sequentially? b. Set up and solve for firm l's output, firm 2's output, market output, and equilibrium price. Show...
Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(Q) 9) = 3Q?. Suppose a second firm enters the market described in question 1 (market demand is 1 still Q = 18 – P) with the same cost (cle) = 109. a. If the two firms successful collude what is the equilibrium market quantity and price? b. If the two firms successfully collude what is the joint profit? C. What do we call a collusion...
Suppose two firms cannot collude and compete in the Cournot Model. Market demand is Q = 18 – P with the cost (c(Q) =*Q). a. Set up firm l's profit maximization. b. Solve for firm l's best response function. c. Solve for firm l's quantity, firm 2's quantity, the equilibrium market quantity, and price. Show your work. d. Is this a Nash equilibrium?
Suppose we have a market with two firms, and market demand Q = 18 - P and a cost c(Q) =Q2. Suppose that firm 1 has first mover advantage. a. What do we call a market where two firms move sequentially? b. Set up and solve for firm 1's output, firm 2's output, market output, and equilibrium price. Show all work for each step. C. Do consumers prefer this over the Cournot equilibrium? d. Does firm 2 prefer this type...
Suppose we have two firms with the same cost C(q) = {Q2 in a market which demand is Q 18 – P, the two firms compete in the Cournot Model. a. Set up firm 1's profit maximization and best response function. b. Solve for firm 1's quantity, firm 2's quantity, the equilibrium market quantity, and price. Please show your work. c. Is this a Nash equilibrium?
3. Suppose the two firms cannot collude and instead compete in the Cournot Model in the market described in question 1 (market demand is still Q = 18 – P) with the same cost (C(Q)=Q2). e. Do consumers prefer the Cournot competition equilibrium over the collusion of the two firms in question 3? f. Do the two firms prefer Cournot competition over colluding (assuming the collusion agreement is to split joint profits equally)?
Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(Q) 9) = 3Q?. Suppose that that firm 2 that invests in a new technology that changes it cost structure from firm 1. Market demand is still Q = 18 – P, firm 1 still faces costs 1 f(0) == Q}, and now firm 2 has costs, C3(Qx) = 23. Consider a Cournot model again. a. What is firm 1's best response function? b. Set up...
3. There are two firms that compete according to Cournot competition. Firm 1 has a cost function G(91) = 5.59+12. Firm 2 has a cost function C(q2) = 2.5q3 + 18. These firms cannot discriminate, so there is just one price that is determined by the aggregate demand. The inverse demand equation is P(Q) = 600 – 0 Where total supply Q-q1+92. (e) Use your best response equations to mathematically solve for the equilibrium quantities qi 9, Q". equilibrium price...