Consider the competitive, static, one-time game depicted in the following figure. If larger payoffs are preferred,...
Consider the competitive, static, one-time game depicted in the following figure.
If larger payoffs are preferred, does either player have a dominant strategy?
If B believes that A will move A1, how should B move?
If B believes that A will move A2, how should B move?
What is the Nash equilibrium strategy profile if this game is played just once?
What is the strategy profile for this game if both players adopt a secure strategy?
What strategy profile results in the best payoff for both players?
Is cooperation a Nash equilibrium if this game is played three times?
If Player A can move first, can Player A's outcome be improved? Use a decision tree to determine the answer.
|
Payoff Matrix: |
||
|---|---|---|
|
B1 |
B2 |
|
|
A1 |
(20,20 |
(5,25) |
|
A2 |
(25,5) |
(2,2) |
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Consider the competitive, static, one-time game depicted in the
following figure.
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